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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

VOTER IDEOLOGY, TAX EXPORTING, AND STATE AND LOCAL TAX
STRUCTURE

State and local governments play an important role in financing and delivering public
services in the United States. In 2008, state and local governments collected 57 percent
of total federal, state, and local revenue (Urban Institute and Brookings Institution, Tax
Policy Center, 2009). The decentralization of fiscal responsibility has enabled a high
degree of variation in state and local tax structures to emerge. This dissertation presents
two empirical studies that extend the positive literature on state and local tax policy.
The extant literature contains evidence of a direct relationship between voter ideology
and state and local tax progressivity. However, the measures of voter ideology that were
used either did not capture differences in the intensity of voter liberalism across states,
did not vary over time, or were beset with other limitations. This study uses the measure
of average voter liberalism developed by Berry et al (1998). I find that average voter
liberalism is significantly and positively-related to progressivity. However, the effect is
small in magnitude. The ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor is
positively-related to progressivity and the effects are economically significant. The
degree of tension between ethnic groups, measured with an index of ethnic residential
segregation, is significantly and inversely-related to progressivity. Both variables are
statistically significant even with average voter liberalism held constant. It is possible
that the ethnic demographic context reflects aspects of voters’ redistributive preferences
that are not captured by measures of ideology.
Researchers have found relationships between states’ tax exporting capacities and the tax
structures they adopt. Chapter 4 is the first study to examine the relationship between
state tax exporting capacities and the business sales taxes. I find that the effective sales
tax rate that governments impose on business purchases is not significantly influenced by
a state’s capacity to export business taxes. It is, however, significantly and positively
affected by a state’s ability to export taxes on households through the deductibility of
state and local taxes under the federal income tax. A decrease in this offset is predicted to

lead to an increase in the effective business sales tax rate, ceteris paribus.
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Chapter 1:

Introduction

In the United States, the provision of public services and taxing power is divided
between the federal, state, and local governments. The decentralization of taxation has
facilitated a high degree of variation in tax structures among states. In 2007, state and
local governments derived 22 percent of their tax revenue from the personal income tax
and 23 percent from the general sales tax (see Table 1.2).

However, state and local

governments in 11 states obtained more than 30 percent of their revenue from the sales tax
and less than 20 percent from the income tax. Four states derived less than 1 percent of
tax revenue from the sales tax. 1 There is also significant variation in the share of tax
revenue derived from the property tax. The standard deviation of the property tax share of
tax revenue was equal to about thirty-one percent of the mean in 2007.
These differences in state and local tax structures lead to significant differences in
the distribution of tax burdens across income groups. One way to measure the
progressivity of state and local tax structures is examine the average tax rate facing a
state's top income quintile as a percentage of the average tax rate facing the bottom
quintile (Top-to-Bottom %). Table 1.1 reports the Top-to-Bottom % for each of the 48
contiguous states in 2007 along with each state's rank according to that measure. We see
that there is considerable variation in the progressivity of state and local tax structures. In
2007, the most progressive state (New York) was three times as progressive as the least
(Washington). The progressivity of state and local tax structures in terms of annual
income is determined by reliance on income taxes relative to consumption and property
taxes as well as the structure of the income tax that is utilized. The states with the most
progressive tax systems are those which rely heavily on the personal income tax. Among
1

Author's calculations from Census of Governments data.
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the ten most progressive states, the average income tax share of tax revenue was about
twenty-nine percent in 2007, which is about one standard deviation above the mean for
that year. Among the ten most regressive states, the average income tax share of tax
revenue was equal to about four percent, which is about one and a half standard deviations
below the mean. Among states that utilize the personal income tax, those with the most
progressive income tax systems have a relatively large number of tax brackets, impose
relatively high marginal tax rates on the top income bracket, and utilize low-income tax
credits. The exemption of food from the sales tax tends to reduce the regressivity of the
sales tax. 2
State and local taxes potentially influence the efficiency with which resources are
allocated. Economists have found evidence that suggests that state and local tax policies
influence household and business location decisions, among other economic choices. 3
Because of the economic significance of state and local taxation, the study of state and
local tax policy from a political economy standpoint is an important enterprise.
The determination of tax structure requires state and local policymakers to make
tradeoffs between efficiency, equity, and the potential political benefits from tax exporting
and the use of hidden taxes. The variation in state and local tax structures may be driven
by variation in voter ideology. The facilitation of such a relationship is often viewed as
one of the benefits of fiscal decentralization. However, subnational tax structures may
also be influenced by tax exporting capacities. Perturbations in these parameters may lead
to adjustments in state and local tax structures that have significant effects on the
efficiency and equity with which subnational public services are financed. If we wish to

2
3

See the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2009).
See Coomes and Hoyt (2008) and Chernick (2010) for reviews of the literature.
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predict the adjustments that are likely to take place, then it is necessary to estimate
comprehensive empirical models of the determination of state and local tax structures.
The two empirical studies presented here contribute to the positive literature on state and
local tax policy. Both studies draw from the political science literatures on state and local
American politics and the empirical economics literatures on tax exporting and tax
competition.
Organization of the Dissertation
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the positive literature on state and
local tax structure, which has sought to answer the following questions: (1) what
determines the tax rates that state and local governments levy on particular bases?; (2)
what political and economic factors determine the mix of state and local taxes (e.g. how
much revenue governments draw from the income tax relative to the sales tax)? The
literature has not provided definitive answers concerning the impact of voter ideology on
state and local tax structure. It has also provided limited information concerning the
determinants of business tax levies.
Using estimates of state and local tax burdens by income group, Chapter 3
examines the relationship between voter ideology and state and local tax progressivity. It
is not the first study to do so. However, past studies on state and local tax progressivity
used measures of voter ideology that either did not capture change in the electorate’s
ideological orientation over time, or they did not reflect differences in the intensity of an
electorate’s liberalism, or they were characterized by other limitations. This study uses the
measure of average voter liberalism developed by Berry et al (1998). The impact of
average voter liberalism was estimated using a generalized method of moments (GMM)
model that included measures of state demographics, tax exporting capacities, voting
3

institutions, and the tax progressivity of neighboring states. I find that average voter
liberalism is significantly and positively-related to state and local tax progressivity.
However, the effect is small in magnitude. The ethnic congruence between the poor and
the non-poor is positively-related to progressivity and the effects are economically
significant, even with average voter liberalism held constant. Thus, it appears that the
weight that the non-poor place on the well-being of the poor is substantially influenced by
ethnic group loyalty. The degree of tension between ethnic groups, measured with an
index of ethnic residential segregation, is significantly and inversely-related to
progressivity even with average voter liberalism held constant. It is possible that ethnic
homogeneity and the amiability of ethnic group relations reflect components of voter
preferences that are not captured by measures of general voter ideology. This study is the
first to examine the relationship between ethnic residential segregation and state and local
tax progressivity.
Chapter 4 estimates the impacts of state tax exporting capacities on state and local
sales taxes (with local sales taxes aggregated to the state level) on business input
purchases and consumer purchases separately. It is the first to examine the relationship
between state tax exporting capacities and business sales taxes, which are the secondlargest component of subnational business tax levies, behind property taxes. Like the
study presented in Chapter 3, the analysis involves the estimation of a multivariate GMM
model. The existing literature suggests that broad measures of sales tax burdens such as
effective sales tax rates and the sales tax’s share of state government revenue are
significantly affected by tax exporting capacities. This study was carried out to determine
whether the influence of tax exporting capacities extends to the levies imposed on the

4

components of the sales tax base. I find that the effective sales tax rate that governments
impose on business purchases is not significantly influenced by a state’s capacity to export
business taxes. It is, however, significantly and positively affected by a state’s ability to
export taxes on households through the deductibility of state and local taxes under the
federal income tax. A decrease in the offset provided by the federal deduction is predicted
to lead to an increase in the effective business sales tax rate, ceteris paribus. The estimates
presented here suggest that the elimination of the deductibility of personal taxes under the
federal income tax is likely to prompt state and local governments to shift reliance from
relatively-visible personal taxes to less visible sales taxes on firms. The deductibility
offset for personal taxes does not appear to be significantly related to consumer sales tax
levies. The ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor is positively-related to
producer sales tax levies but does not appear to be significantly-related to consumer sales
tax levies. Support for public spending may be lower in states that are ethnically
heterogeneous. As a result, governments may rely more heavily on hidden taxes such as
the sales tax on business inputs. Finally, Chapter 5 has a discussion of the findings, a
summary of the dissertation, conclusions, limitations, implications, and recommendations
for future research.

5

Table 1.1: State and Local Tax Progressivity across the 48 Contiguous States, 2007
States
New York
Vermont
South Carolina
Wisconsin
Maine
Delaware
Oregon
Montana
Minnesota
Idaho
Kentucky
North Carolina
Kansas
California
Maryland
Michigan
New Jersey
West Virginia
Virginia
Missouri
Iowa
Nebraska
Ohio
Utah
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Georgia
Mississippi
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Oklahoma
Indiana
New Mexico
Louisiana
North Dakota
Pennsylvania
Alabama
Illinois
Arizona
New Hampshire
Texas
Tennessee
Nevada
South Dakota
Wyoming
Florida
Washington
Mean (std. dev.)

Top-to-Bottom %
113.9
108.6
106.6
103.9
102
99.5
97.7
97.4
96.7
93.7
92.9
92.2
91.1
91.1
89.6
89.2
89
87.2
85.6
82.8
81.7
77.3
76.4
76.2
75.7
75.1
71.2
70.9
70.7
69.9
69.1
68.7
66
65.5
65.2
63.1
61.1
60.6
53.5
52.4
51.5
41.9
40.4
39.7
37.6
36.4
32.4
31.3
74.8 (29.1)

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Source: Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2009)
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Table 1.2: Tax Structure Characteristics of the 48 Contiguous States, 2007
States
New York
Vermont
South
Carolina
Wisconsin
Maine
Delaware
Oregon
Montana
Minnesota
Idaho
Kentucky
North
Carolina
Kansas
California
Maryland
Michigan
New Jersey
West Virginia
Virginia
Missouri
Iowa
Nebraska
Ohio
Utah
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Georgia
Mississippi
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Oklahoma
Indiana
New Mexico
Louisiana
North Dakota
Pennsylvania
Alabama
Illinois
Arizona
New
Hampshire
Texas
Tennessee
Nevada
South Dakota
Wyoming
Florida
Washington
Mean(StDev)

Inc Tax Share of Tax Rev.
31.84
19.81

Sales Tax Share of Tax Rev.
16.41
11.59

Prop Tax Share of Tax Rev.
28.41
42.16

Rank
1
2

23.49
27.15
25.59
29.34
44.02
25.46
30.57
29.54
29.49

24.31
19.06
18.37
0
0
0
19.22
26.83
20.56

31.13
36
35.86
15.55
31.05
33.84
25.85
23.41
18.83

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

32.66
24.19
29.65
39.7
18.64
22.81
22.3
31.63
26.96
25.08
22.9
30.08
28.17
35.5
22.69
26.6
15.9
23.63
25.74
29.45
23.48
24.48
15.81
18.27
12.2
26.17
23.21
17.09
16.06

21.95
26.57
23.3
12.74
21.53
16.75
18.52
14.51
26.02
21.23
24.4
20.59
28.16
12.69
18.3
29.88
35.79
41.28
27.2
14.09
28.81
25.44
36.08
40.05
21.95
17.21
29.75
16.64
40.14

22.54
30.47
27.05
24.2
39.19
41.78
18.63
30.95
27.43
33.08
33.03
29.14
22.42
34.38
41.03
28.77
25.02
14.69
30.4
37.51
16.34
28.94
13.54
14.84
26.87
28.63
15.49
37.14
26.67

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

2.27
0
1.33
0
0
0
0
0
21.47 (11.17)

0
30.86
46.64
33.83
40.56
28.32
33.16
47.51
23.51 (11.41)

61.4
41.69
24.04
27.53
34.26
36.87
36.79
26.76
29.4 (9.07)

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Copyright © John M. Foster 2012
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Chapter 2:

Voter Ideology, Fiscal Federalism, and State and Local Tax Structure

Introduction
This chapter reviews three empirical literatures that are relevant for the research
presented in later chapters. The literatures examined are the political science literature on
the influence of ideology on state and local tax progressivity and the tax exporting and tax
competition literatures from economics. These literatures also comprise the bulk of the
positive empirical analysis of state and local tax policy determination that has been
conducted. The chapter is organized as follows: Section I describes the theoretical
frameworks that have been used in these studies. Section II reviews studies that examine
the relationship between state and local tax progressivity and voter ideology. Sections III
and IV summarize the empirical literatures on tax exporting and tax competition,
respectively. Section V describes the extensions to the empirical literature provided by
this dissertation.
Theoretical Frameworks
Governments utilize multiple tax instruments. The choice of tax rates, or the tax
structure, influences the allocation of resources and the distribution of after-tax income.
Economists and political scientists have long been interested in developing predictive
models of government behavior. The motivations of legislators have been modeled in
different ways. Whether the model posits that legislators intend to maximize revenue, the
utility of the representative citizen, or expected political support, governments may be
influenced by the ideological preferences of their constituents. However, subnational
governments must also deal with the constraints and opportunities created by fiscal
federalism. Many tax bases are mobile among jurisdictions. Consequently, a tax imposed
by a particular jurisdiction may affect the size of its tax bases. Because of interstate

8

commerce, tax bases often overlap jurisdictions. For example, a portion of the
consumption expenditures that are made in a state consists of purchases made by
nonresidents. The fact that jurisdictions share tax bases creates opportunities for tax
exporting. The deductibility of certain state and local taxes under the federal income tax
allows states and localities to export portions of their tax burdens to federal taxpayers.
Some empirical studies in the tax exporting and tax competition literatures are
based on models in which the government chooses the fiscal platform that maximizes the
utility of a representative citizen. 4 The basis of these models is the conception of the
government as a benevolent, omniscient social planner. With perfect information and
benevolent intentions, the government chooses the tax structure that maximizes the
representative citizen’s utility. The parameters that may influence the choice of the tax
rate(s) are the characteristics of the representative citizen, such as her income, income
sources, and ideological preferences, as well as the characteristics of the economic
environment such as tax exporting capacities and the tax rates levied by competing states.
The notion of government as a benevolent maximizer of the representative citizen's utility
is at odds with the models of self-interested agents that are common in positive economic
theory.
Economists studying public policy from a positive perspective have attempted to
develop models that conceive of policymakers as being self-interested agents who
maximize their own utility (or some variable related to their utility) subject to institutional

4

In the tax exporting literature, see Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) and Metcalf (1993). In the tax competition
literature, see Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) and Rork (2003). Gade and Adkins’s (1990) study of tax
exporting models the government at using the most cost-effective tax structure (in terms of taking advantage
of tax exporting opportunities and holding down deadweight losses and administrative costs) that raises the
revenue desired by the median voter. The theoretical model provides little insight on what forces motivate
the government to use the tax structure that is optimal at least at the level of the jurisdiction.
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constraints. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) develop a positive and normative theory of
public finance that is based on the assumption that the government is a revenuemaximizer. Traditional public finance is based on the assumption that the government is a
benevolent, utility-maximizer. Under the traditional approach, the government can
minimize excess burden imposed by a given level of revenue by following the inverseelasticity rule (i.e. the Ramsey rule). A revenue-maximizing government would also
follow the inverse-elasticity rule but spending may exceed the Pareto optimal level.
Because of rational ignorance among voters and possible collusion between parties,
political competition may leave a revenue-maximizing government with a great deal of
slack. If citizens believe that they will be limited in their ability to control a revenuemaximizing government in the post-constitutional period, they may rationally include
constraints on the government’s taxing power in the constitution. There are three possible
constraints: constraints on tax rates, allowable tax bases, and constraints imposed by
decentralization, which increases interjurisdictional competition. Though the use of
narrow tax bases allows for substitution away from taxation and thus excess burden,
citizens may rationally include provisions for narrow tax bases in order to limit excessive
government spending. At the constitutional stage, citizens choose the tax bases that are
likely to provide sufficient revenue to finance the desired level of public services. The
level of public services that citizens desire is determined by the excess burden of the tax
instruments employed and the proportion of revenue that citizens expect the government
to actually spend on the provision of services (i.e. the proportion that is not withheld as
pure surplus). Citizens can increase the proportion of revenue devoted to the provision of
public goods and services by choosing tax bases that depend on the provision of public

10

goods and services. An example would be taxes on motor fuels and automobile purchases.
Citizens will engage in those taxable activities to the extent that their government builds
and maintains roads. Thus, the government has an incentive to divert a larger proportion of
revenue to public good provision since it promotes taxable activities.
Nelson (1986) tests the Leviathan theory using cross-sectional data on state
government tax structures.5 He finds that the presence of a state corporation income tax is
negatively related to state revenue as a share of state personal income. The corporation
income tax may limit Leviathan governments since increasing the tax burden on
corporations may cause them to relocate. This would reduce the government’s tax base.
Nelson also finds that broad-based personal income and general sales taxes are positively
related to revenue. For the personal income tax, broadness is characterized by the
inclusion of labor and investment income. Broad sales tax bases are characterized by the
taxation of a substantial number of services. These results suggest that it may be rational
for citizens to constrain their governments to tax narrow bases if they believe that political
competition does not effectively constrain government fiscal behavior. Kau and Rubin
(1981) obtain theoretical and empirical results that are analogous to the Leviathan model.
The authors assume that governments are revenue maximizers and hypothesize that the
growth in the size of government that occurred in the 20th century can be attributed to
changes in economic activity, such as the shift away from self-employment and the shift of
women from home production into market production, which increased the size of tax
bases, like wage income, that are relatively easy for the government to tax.

5

Most empirical tests of the Leviathan model examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and
tax, expenditure, and debt limitations on government size. See Mueller (2003, 380-383) for a discussion of
the empirical literature.
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Boardman (2002) examines the relationship between state sales tax base coverage
and rates to determine whether state governments tend to maximize residents’ utility or
revenues. If the government’s objective is to maximize the utility of the representative
resident, then an increase in the coverage of a tax base should be accompanied by a
perfectly offsetting reduction in the tax rate. In other words, an increase in the coverage of
a tax base should be revenue-neutral. However, if the government seeks to maximize
revenue, then an increase in the coverage of the tax base is unlikely to be accompanied by
a perfectly offsetting tax rate reduction. That is, an increase in base coverage could lead to
a higher level of government spending. Using a state-level panel dataset, Boardman finds
that sales tax base coverage and the sales tax rate tend to be inversely-related, but the
relationship does not lead to revenue-neutral adjustments. States with broader sales tax
base coverage tend to spend more. Boardman’s study provides evidence against the
conception of government as a utility maximizer but it does not provide definitive
evidence on what governments’ objective(s) actually are. Governments may raise
additional revenue from a broader sales tax base to buy the support of active constituent
groups. Electoral competition is not a stringent constraint in the Leviathan model, but the
probabilistic voter model proceeds from the assumption that fiscal policy platforms are
selected by office-motivated politicians. In this model, the primary goal of parties or
candidates is to maximize expected political support.
The probabilistic voting model was developed in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. 6
In this model, two office-motivated candidates simultaneously and noncooperatively make
binding policy commitments and voters choose the candidate whose policy platform gives

6

See Mueller (2003, 249-263) for a review of the literature.
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them the highest utility. The candidates know how each feasible platform affects the utility
of each voter but they are uncertain about how the voting behavior of each voter will be
affected by different platforms. For example, the candidates know how an increase in a
particular tax rate will affect middle class voters. What they do not know for certain is
how this tax increase will affect the number of the votes that they receive from these
voters. Each candidate chooses the platform that maximizes the probability of winning.
Hettich and Winer’s (1999) application of the probabilistic voting model to the
determination of tax policy has been the most frequently used theoretical framework in the
empirical literatures. In a tax policy context, each candidate chooses each tax rate so that
the marginal loss in expected political support is equal to the marginal gain from public
spending and the marginal loss of support from each tax is equal. A government can
potentially obtain greater support by shifting tax burdens to non-residents and being
attentive to the ideological orientation of voters as well as the tax structures of competing
jurisdictions.
In equilibrium, the weight that a particular voter’s welfare receives has been shown
to depend on the extent to which that voter is biased in favor of a particular candidate,
whether he or she is a member of an organized interest group, and on the size of that
group. 7 All else equal, larger groups should be more influential than smaller groups.
Organized interest groups that make campaign contributions should be more influential

7

Coughlin, Mueller, and Murrell (1990) present a formal model in which the weight that a particular interest
group receives depends on the number of votes that it can be expected to deliver in response to preferential
treatment. Hettich and Winer (1999) extend this model to explain the determination of tax structure. The
influence of a particular interest group increases if that group becomes more ideologically homogeneous or
less biased in favor of a particular candidate or party. In Persson and Tabellini (2000), organized groups
make campaign contributions that are used for political advertising. In equilibrium, the weight that a
particular group receives depends on its share of the population and on the marginal effect of political
advertising on the candidate’s expected vote share.
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than non-contributing interest groups of the same size. Voter groups that are strongly
biased in favor of a particular candidate or party concerning a non-fiscal issue, such as an
issue concerning religion or race, are predicted to receive less consideration from
candidates when they choose their fiscal platforms. Voter groups that have more swing
voters, or voters who are not biased in favor of a particular candidate or party and who
care only about fiscal policy, are predicted to receive more consideration.
The utility maximization, Leviathan, and probabilistic voting models all predict
that governments are likely to take advantage of tax exporting opportunities and are likely
to be responsive to citizen ideology and to the tax rates imposed by competing states.
Estimating the impacts of voter ideology, tax exporting, and tax competition on state and
local tax structure will not enable us to distinguish utility maximizing behavior among
governments from revenue or political support maximization.
The Role of Ideology
Conventional public finance theory posits that redistribution should be carried out
primarily by the federal government for two reasons: first, there may be national spillovers
in the benefits for altruistic voters; second, redistribution carried out at the state or local
level could prompt the in-migration of poor households and out-migration of the rich. 8
Some states have complemented the progressive federal income tax with progressive tax
systems of their own. This is untrue of most states. On average, low-income households
pay a larger share of their income in state and local taxes than wealthy households. In
other words, state and local tax systems tend to be regressive. Variation in state and local
tax structures may be driven to some extent by voters’ ideological orientations. Whether

8

See Tresch (2002, 832-928) for a review of the theoretical literature on fiscal federalism.
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governments wish to maximize the representative voter’s utility or maximize expected
political support, they are likely to be attentive to the distribution of ideological
preferences. A relationship between tax progressivity and citizen ideology may be
observed even if political competition does not preclude shirking by legislators. If the tax
structure deviates from citizens’ values beyond a certain degree, ignorance ceases to be
rational and incumbents may be thrown out of office. Thus, a statistically-significant
relationship between voter ideology and tax progressivity is consistent with the Leviathan
model.
Political scientists and economists have examined the relationship between state
and local tax progressivity and measures of the average voter’s ideology. There are at
least five measures of the average voter’s ideology in the political science and economics
literatures. Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) pool survey data across numerous years
to obtain state-representative samples. The authors measured average citizen liberalism in
each state with the percentage of respondents who identified themselves as liberals. The
authors estimated the relationship between their measure of citizen liberalism and state
and local tax progressivity, among other policy variables. They found that the percentage
of voters identifying as liberal is positively-related to state and local tax progressivity.
There are three significant limitations to the validity of the Erikson, Wright, and McIver
(1993) measure of average voter liberalism. Because the authors obtained representative
state samples by pooling many years of surveys, the measure does not change over time.
Another limitation of the measure is that it does not capture differences in the intensity of
a respondent’s liberalism. Respondents are not permitted to indicate how liberal or
conservative they are. Another potential problem is that ideological self-identification
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may not map consistently into policy preferences. According to Stimson (1991), “the
symbols, personalities, ideas, and images underlying ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ include
much content that is other than prescriptions for public policy” (Stimson 1991, 61). Thus,
the Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) measure may be a weak measure of operational
ideology, or the kinds of policies that citizens prefer.
Chernick (1992) measures average voter liberalism with the average AFL-CIO
rating of state assemblies. An important limitation of the measure used by Chernick
(1992) is that it only gauges the ideological orientation of the citizens who voted for the
winning candidates. He finds that this measure is positively-related to state and local tax
progressivity. Morgan (1995) uses Holbrook-Provow and Poe’s (1987) measure of general
voter conservatism. The measure is the average Conservative Coalition score for the
state’s congressional delegation. Morgan finds that the ideology measure is inverselyrelated to state and local tax progressivity. Like the measure used by Chernick (1992), the
Holbrook-Provow and Poe (1987) measure does not take the preferences of those who
voted for the opposition into account. These measures are closer approximations of the
ideologies of governments than of electorates.
Fletcher and Murray (2008) measure citizens’ tastes for redistribution with the share of
votes received by Al Gore in 2000 and with the United Way’s State of Caring Index, which
is a composite measure that includes several variables associated with charitable activity.
The former measure is problematic since it does not capture differences in the intensity of
liberal ideology among different electorates. The constructive validity of the latter
measure is limited because government redistributive policies and private charity may be
substitutes. These ideology measures were statistically insignificant. The analysis
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presented in the next chapter will estimate the relationship between average voter
liberalism and state and local tax progressivity using a more constructively valid measure
of average voter liberalism.
Voters may balance their ideological preferences against their narrow financial selfinterests. As a result, legislators may be able to gain political support by taking advantage
of tax exporting opportunities.
Tax Exporting
Tax exporting occurs when a portion of a jurisdiction's tax burden is shifted to
nonresidents through federal tax deductibility provisions or inter-jurisdictional commerce
and investment. The deductibility of state and local taxes under the federal income tax
provides states and localities with an ample opportunity to shift the costs of subnational
government to the national level. The deduction subsidizes the use of deductible tax
instruments. State and local general sales taxes were deductible along with income and
property taxes until the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which repealed sales tax deductibility.
The 2004 American Jobs Creation Act authorized deductibility of sales taxes in lieu of
income taxes, meaning that taxpayers can deduct either income or sales taxes, but not
both. Corporations and proprietors can deduct state and local tax burdens that constitute
normal business expenses under the federal corporate and personal income taxes,
respectively. States can also export taxes by levying taxes on firms that sell goods outside
of the state and perhaps have nonresident investors. States with natural resources such as
fuel and precious metals can potentially shift portions of business tax burdens to
nonresident consumers as well as to nonresident investors in those industries. The ability
of states to export taxes on natural resources to consumers depends on whether it
dominates the market. If the state’s natural resource industries do not dominate their
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markets then most of the exporting will be backwards to out-of-state investors (McLure
1967; Gade and Adkins 1990). The portion that is not borne by capital will most likely be
divided between in-state workers and land owners. The presence of amenities like
beaches or mountains may draw tourists whose consumption can be taxed.
A certain degree of tax exporting is sensible since nonresidents who benefit from a
particular jurisdiction’s should pay tax prices that equal the marginal costs of the services
from which they benefit. Tourists utilize infrastructure, public safety, and other services
when they visit a jurisdiction. However, politicians may use taxes that fall at least
partially on nonresidents to cross-subsidize a broad range of services, including those that
mainly benefit residents. McLure (1967) argues that tax exporting may lead to
overprovision of subnational public services since it lowers the cost of public spending
relative to private spending. This perspective was challenged by Mieszkowski and Toder
(1983). The authors consider a model in which local governments maximize the revenue
derived from exporting. If the desired level of spending can be fully supported by that
revenue, no increase in the size of the public sector will follow from exporting. If,
however, the demand for public goods is higher than that supported by exported taxes, the
incremental services must be financed solely by resident taxpayers and there is no increase
in government size. Wildasin (1987) generalizes that model and concludes that
government size may be stimulated in some instances by tax exporting, but that is not
generally the case. Even if tax exporting does not affect the size of the subnational sector,
it is likely to influence state and local tax structure.
Governments wishing to maximize political support have an obvious incentive to
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shift portions of the tax burden onto nonresidents. 9 An omniscient, benevolent social
planner seeking to maximize the utility of a subnational jurisdiction’s representative
resident would also take advantage of tax exporting opportunities. A Leviathan
government would rely more heavily on taxes that are deductible under federal personal
and corporate income taxes. This is because the federal offset reduces the responsiveness
of the tax base to the subnational tax. Reliance on nondeductible tax instruments would
most likely be driven primarily by relative elasticities and the tax rates levied by
competing jurisdictions. 10
Researchers have examined the influence of tax exporting on state and local tax
structures by developing measures of tax exporting capacities and estimating the effects of
those capacities on various state and local tax rates or on the shares of various tax
instruments in state and local revenues. The size of the offset provided by federal
deductibility is typically measured with the jurisdiction’s average net-of-federal tax price
of a dollar paid to a deductible tax. The net-of-federal tax price of a particular tax
instrument is given by
P=1-pm

(2.1)

where p is the proportion of taxpayers who itemize and m is the average marginal federal
tax rate facing itemizers in each state. Six states permit deduction of federal income tax
paid on the state income tax. Metcalf (1993) presents a formula for the state average net-

9

Wildasin (1987) provides insights on the extent to a which a government is likely to rely on a tax that falls
on both residents and nonresidents. In the theoretical model, an omniscient, benevolent government taxes
two commodities: one which is consumed entirely by residents and another which is consumed by both
residents and non-residents. Wildasin shows that the pair of tax rates that maximizes the representative
citizen’s utility equalizes the marginal economic cost of each tax.
10
Tax rates may be pushed below their revenue-maximizing levels by interjurisdictional competition.
Crowley and Sobel (2011) find that municipalities and county governments tend to levy tax rates that fall
well below the revenue-maximizing rates.
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of-federal tax price that takes the deductibility of federal income tax paid under the state
income tax into account. For itemizers in these states, the tax price is given by
(2.2)
with Tf equaling the marginal federal income tax rate and Ts equaling the marginal state
income tax rate. Since the inception of the federal income tax, the average net-of-federal
tax prices for the income and property taxes have been given by equation (2.1) in states
that do not allow deductibility of federal income taxes under their state income taxes and
by (2.2) in states that do. Because state and local sales taxes were not deductible from
1987 to 2003, the cost of $1 paid in state and local sales taxes was $1. Over time and
between states, the net-of-federal price of a deductible tax decreases with the average
marginal federal income tax rate faced by itemizers and with the proportion of taxpayers
who itemize. The net-of-federal tax price of a deductible tax is also reduced by the
deductibility of the federal income tax under a state income tax.
One would expect reliance on a particular tax instrument to be increasing in its
own exportability and decreasing in the exportability of alternative instruments. Lindsay
(1987) found that the net-of-federal tax price of deductible revenues is inversely-related
to income tax revenue per capita, but insignificantly-related to the use of sales and
property taxes by state and local governments. Gade and Adkins (1990) find that the netof-federal price of the income tax is inversely-related to the share of state own-tax
revenue constituted by the income tax. The income tax price is positively-related to use
of the sales tax. Sales tax price is inversely-related to use of the sales tax but is not
significantly related to income tax reliance. Metcalf (1993) find that the net-of-federal tax
price of the income tax is negatively-related to use of the income tax. Unlike Gade and
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Adkins (1990), he finds no significant relationship between income tax price and use of
the general sales tax. He also finds an insignificant relationship between sales tax price
and use of the general sales tax. Hettich and Winer (1999) find that the net-of-federal tax
price is negatively-related to a state’s average income tax rate. Bahl et al (2002) obtain
similar results. Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1990) find that the net-of-federal tax price of the
property tax is inversely-related to local property tax rates. Deductibility may also
influence state and local government use of taxes that are levied on firms and which are
not deductible by households. Metcalf (1993) find that the net-of-federal price of the
income tax is positively-related to the corporate income tax rate. A decrease (increase) in
a state’s ability to export personal income taxes appears to prompt states exploit to
business tax exporting opportunities to a greater (lesser) extent, ceteris paribus.
However, state and local corporate income taxes constitute a small fraction of subnational
business tax levies. In 2008, only 8.5 percent of state and local business tax revenue
came from corporate income taxes (Cline et al 2009). Thus, we are left with little
information concerning how state and local business tax levies may change in response to
changes in the offsets provided under the federal personal income tax. None of studies
discussed here include a proxy for the extent to which a state benefits from deductibility
of state and local taxes on firms under the federal corporate and personal income taxes.
Because of the potential exportability of taxes on natural resource firms, states in
which natural resource industries are relatively prominent may rely relatively heavily on
severance, corporate income, and property taxes and less heavily on taxes that are borne
primarily by residents (i.e. personal income taxes and sales taxes on consumer goods), all
else equal. One would also expect a larger share of sales tax revenue to be garnered from
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business input purchases, ceteris paribus. Gade and Adkins (1990) find that the mining
share of state personal income is inversely-related to personal income and sales tax
reliance but positively-related to taxes on motor fuels and other selective sales taxes.
Hettich and Winer (1999) find that the mining share of state income is inversely-related to
income tax rates.
A state in which tourism constitutes a large share of economic activity may rely
more heavily on sales and excise taxes and license fees than other states since nonresident
consumption takes up large shares of those bases. Gade and Adkins (1990) find that the
prominence of tourism in a state’s economy is inversely-related to income and sales tax
reliance and positively-related to reliance on recreational license fees. Use of license fees
may allocate the costs of public services used by tourists onto tourists to a greater degree
than consumption taxes. Unlike Gade and Adkins, (1990), Metcalf (1993) find that
tourism is positively-related to sales tax reliance. None of the studies discussed here
include explicit measures of the taxes imported by states. Tax importing will affect the
income of residents and may in turn influence tax rates. However, the proxies for tax
exporting capacities used in these studies are probably also good proxies for the net
benefits obtained from tax exporting. The importing and exporting of taxes do not
constitute the only dimension of interdependency created by fiscal federalism. The tax
rates levied by subnational governments influence the allocation of mobile tax bases such
as capital across the federation. The mobility of tax bases at the subnational level may
promote fiscal competition between jurisdictions.
Tax Competition
The utility maximization, Leviathan, and probabilistic voting models predict that a
particular jurisdiction should respond to the tax rates levied by competing jurisdictions.
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When governments tax mobile bases, a particular government’s tax rate on that base
influences both the private and public consumption of the citizenry (see Wildasin 1987;
Hoyt 1991). The jurisdiction’s supply of the mobile base (capital in many models though
it could be skilled labor) affects private consumption since it is typically a production
input (e.g. the supply of capital is positively-related to the productivity of labor and thus
affects wage income). The marginal revenue for public good provision depends on the
extent to which taxation erodes available tax bases.
If the jurisdiction is large enough to affect the rate of return, then tax competition
occurs. The effect of a competing jurisdiction’s tax rate on that of a particular jurisdiction,
or the sign of the reaction function, has been shown to be theoretically ambiguous (see
Brueckner and Saveedra 2001;Rork 2003). Because the political support function
maximized by candidates in the probabilistic voting model is based on voter utility
functions, this ambiguous result can be obtained from the probabilistic voting model.
Deskins and Hill (2010) model tax competition in a Leviathan framework and also obtain
a reaction function with an ambiguous sign. Determining the magnitude and direction of
the effects of tax competition is an empirical exercise. Tax competition may be driven not
just by tax base competition but also by the information spillovers provided by the
coexistence of multiple jurisdictions. Besley and Case (1995) show that voters may use
the tax rates imposed by neighboring states or by states that are demographically and/or
economically-similar as yardsticks to measure the efficiency of their own government. It
is difficult to empirically distinguish tax base competition from yardstick competition
(Brueckner 2003).
Minimizing the political costs of raising revenue or maximizing revenue or
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citizens’ utility requires elected officials to respond to the tax structures imposed by other
jurisdictions. Both Hettich and Winer (1999) and Rork (2003) find that the average
personal income tax rates of contiguous states are inversely-related to a state’s tax rates.
Hettich and Winer attribute this finding to the presence of interstate commuting. States
with a relatively large number of workers who commute may rely more heavily on the
income tax since commuting workers can only vote in the states in which they live. In
other words, taxing workers who commute from neighboring states is a form of tax
exporting. It is important to note that this type of tax exporting is impossible in states that
have reciprocity agreements with their neighbors. If a state has a reciprocity agreement
with a neighboring state, then taxpayers in each state are subject to the state income tax
administered by their state of residency, even if they earn income in the other state.
According to Rork and Wagner (2011), fourteen states were part of at least one reciprocity
agreement in 2003. 11 In his 2003 study, Rork attributes the negative sign on the average
income tax burden of neighboring states to the low mobility of the personal income base.
He argues that the number of residents who relocate in response to state income tax
differentials is likely to be insignificant. By “recognizing the inelastic response of its
residents, states can recover some of the revenue lost to relocation by simply raising
personal income tax rates at home” (Rork 2003, 785). Rork provides a similar explanation
for the negative sign on the average sales tax burden imposed by neighboring states. In
Rork (2003), the coefficient on the average corporate income tax rate imposed by

11

Coomes and Hoyt (2008) find that movers who locate in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) that
comprise states without reciprocity agreements are likely to choose the low tax state. They attribute this
result to the greater dissimilarity in the tax structures of contiguous states that do not have reciprocity
agreements.
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neighbors is positive. Rork also finds an inverse relationship between the average sales
tax rates of contiguous states and a state’s sales tax rate. The coefficients on the average
corporate income, gasoline, and cigarette tax rates of neighboring states are positive.
Nelson (2002) finds that a state’s tax rates on cigarettes, beer, liquor, motor fuels, and
insurance are tend to be positively-affected by those levied by its neighbors. Brueckner
and Saavedra (1990) utilize data on Massachusetts local governments and find that a local
government’s property tax rate is positively-affected by those of neighboring jurisdictions.
While Rork only looks at tax competition between contiguous states, Hettich and
Winer also consider tax competition between non-contiguous states. The authors assumed
that a state’s closest competitor is the state that is the most similar in terms of income
inequality. Presumably, the degree of income inequality reflects the level of economic
development in a state which is one way to group substitute states. The authors found a
positive relationship between the income tax rates of competitor states and that of the
observed state. Fletcher and Murray (2006) explore the influence of interstate tax
competition on state sales tax base coverage. The authors identify five competitor states
for each state, based on similar values for measures such as the manufacturing, service,
and government shares of employment, state personal income, personal income tax share
of total income, and the percentage of population in poverty, among other variables. They
do not detect significant strategic interaction among contiguous states. Instead, states that
have similar levels of personal income, poverty, government shares of employment and
personal income tax burdens tend to engage in strategic interaction in the development of
their sales tax policies. The estimated slopes of the reaction functions are invariably
positive. Estimates of the effects of fiscal competition based on spatial weights matrices
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which are based on economic or demographic closeness must be interpreted with caution.
This is because the own-state tax variable, which is the dependent variable in these cases,
may be correlated with the elements of the weighting matrices (Anselin 2001; Rork and
Wagner 2012).
Implications for Research
Three empirical literatures have examined the determinants of state and local tax
structure: studies of the determinants of state and local tax progressivity and the
economics literatures on tax exporting and tax competition. Political scientists and
economists have examined the influence of voter ideology on state and local tax
progressivity. However, the studies used measures of voter ideology that either did not
account for change in the electorate’s ideological orientation over time, or they failed to
account for differences in the intensity of an electorate’s liberalism, or they suffered from
other limitations. The next chapter presents an analysis that uses a more constructivelyvalid measure of voter ideology.
Tax exporting and tax competition may cause state and local tax structures to
deviate from the tax structures that are consistent with the population’s ideological
tendencies. Subnational governments can export tax burdens through federal deductibility
provisions, by taxing goods purchased by tourists, or by taxing inputs or income of firms
that sell to nonresident consumers or have nonresident investors. Economists have
consistently found that the offset to state and local personal income taxes provided by
federal deductibility is positively related to state and local income tax reliance. The
evidence concerning the effects of federal deductibility on sales and property tax reliance
is mixed. It is possible that reliance on a particular tax is increasing in the net-of-federal
tax price of alternative instruments. There is some evidence that suggests that the net-of26

federal tax price of the personal income tax is positively-related to both sales and
corporate income taxes. There is evidence that tax exporting opportunities offered by the
presence of mining industries is inversely-related to the use of income and sales taxes.
The evidence on the effects of tourism on tax structure is mixed. Because the tax
exporting literature has only examined the relationship between tax exporting and the
corporate income tax, little is known about the effects of tax exporting on subnational
business tax levies. None of the studies discussed here include proxies for the benefit that
a state derives from corporate tax deductibility. The study presented in Chapter 4 provides
new insights on the impact of tax exporting and subnational business tax levies by
utilizing state-level data on state and local sales taxes garnered from business input
purchases. Sales taxes on non-labor input purchases constitute the second-largest
component of subnational business tax levies, behind property taxes. The study examines
the impacts of the deductibility provisions of both the federal personal income and
corporate income taxes along with the impacts of mining and tourism. Only one previous
study, Fletcher and Murray (2006), examined the determinants of sales tax levies on firms.
The authors only examined the determinants of the treatment of manufacturing equipment
and focused on tax competition.
The empirical studies that follow contribute to the positive literature on state and
local tax structure by answering the following questions. To what extent is state and local
tax structure influenced by voter ideology? What is the direction and magnitude of the
impact? Are differences in subnational tax structures driven primarily by ideological
differences or by differences in tax exporting opportunities and in regional fiscal
environments?
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Chapter 3:

Voter Ideology, Ethnic Demographics, and State and Local Tax

Progressivity
As was discussed at length in Chapter 1, there is a high degree of variation in the
progressivity of state and local tax systems. Differences in the tax policies adopted by
governments reflect differences in priorities and economic circumstances. Policymakers
have to compete for office. State and local tax policy, therefore, is likely to be shaped by
voter preferences, among other factors. These tax policy preferences of voters are likely
to be influenced by their ideological orientation. Past studies on state and local tax
progressivity have used measures of voter ideology as an explanatory variable but the
measures may be characterized by significant limitations, which were described in the
previous chapter.
The analyses presented in this chapter use the measure of the average voter’s
liberalism developed by Berry et al (1998). The analysis utilizes state and local incidence
data on the 48 contiguous states for 1995, 2002, and 2007. I find that average voter
liberalism is positively related to state and local tax progressivity but that the effect is
small in magnitude. A state's ethnic demographic context has statistically and
economically-significant effects on the progressivity of the tax structures utilized by state
and local governments. The ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor is
positively-related to progressivity. The tension between ethnic groups, measured with an
index of ethnic residential segregation, has a negative impact. The effects of these
variables are considerably larger than that of the average voter's liberalism even with the
latter variable held constant. This suggests that the degree of ethnic overlap between the
poor and the non-poor and the amiability of relations between ethnic groups reflect
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components of voter preferences that may not be captured by measures of general voter
ideology. This is the first study to examine the association between ethnic residential
segregation and state and local tax progressivity.
Conceptual Framework
Some voters may view the adoption of more progressive tax policies as a means to
promote economic justice while others may view it as punishment for hard work and
ingenuity. When elected representatives design a tax structure, they have to take
conflicting interests into account. How do the representatives weight these different
interests? In the United States, politicians have to compete for office. Thus, the
determination of tax policy should be examined in the context of electoral competition.
As was discussed at length in the previous chapter, Hettich and Winer (1999)
developed a theoretical model in which the process of electoral competition forces
political agents to take the interests of the electorate into account when designing the tax
structure. Candidates running for office choose the fiscal platform that maximizes
expected support from citizens who vote their self-interest. The weight that a particular
citizen’s welfare receives can depend on the responsiveness of that citizen’s voting
behavior to fiscal policy, whether he or she is a member of an organized interest group,
and on the size of that group.
In Hettich and Winer’s model, voters only care about their own tax burden. This
assumption is questionable. Analyses of survey data on support for redistribution by
government by Fong (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) suggest that preferences
for redistribution are influenced not just by financial self-interest but also by the extent to
which one believes that the economic system is “fair”. Respondents who believed that
society provides equal opportunities to all and that economic well-being is mainly
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determined by one’s own effort and ability tended to be less supportive of redistribution,
ceteris paribus. Emphasis on the role of personal effort and ability in the determination of
one’s position in the income distribution tends to be associated with conservative views
while belief in the dominance of luck and social connections tends to be associated with
more liberal perspectives. Fong (2001) finds that the marginal effects of respondents’
beliefs concerning distributive justice on support for redistribution were large in
magnitude, even with respondents’ economic and demographic characteristics held
constant. The marginal effects of those beliefs were twice as large as those of income.
The following theoretical model illustrates the manner in which electoral competition
forces governments to take voters’ ideological preferences into account when choosing tax
structures. Suppose that society consists of two classes, rich (R) and poor (P). The two
groups are distinguished by different levels of innate labor productivity, denoted by ai,
i=R, P. The class difference exists because aR > aP. Each group lives on labor income and
a cash subsidy, f, that is the same for both groups. For both groups, utility is based on
private consumption, Ci, leisure, Xi, and the consumption of the other income group, Cj.
The government finances public good provision by levying ad valorem taxes on the labor
income of the rich and poor, tR and tP. 12 I assume a quasi-linear utility function. 13
(3.1)
The parameter Θji is the weight that income group i places on the consumption of group j.
I assume that it can be positive, negative, or equal to zero. The parameter captures the
liberalism of the income group. For example, a poor group interested in “class warfare”
12

For simplicity, I assume that the government can observe the innate ability of each income group.
Quasi-linearity simplifies the model since the income effects only show up in the linear components. This
assumption is common in political economy models of redistributive policies. See Persson and Tabellini
(2000).
13
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may attach a negative weight to the consumption of the rich. Alternatively, a poor group
with conservative leanings may place a large positive weight on the consumption of the
rich since they believe that the rich are entitled to the fruits of their labor. A liberal rich
group may heavily weight the consumption of the poor.
I assume that the real wage is exogenous and normalized at unity. As was
mentioned above, the productivity of each class differs. Consequently, each class has a
different amount of effective time available. 14 The budget and time constraints of a voter
from group i are given below:
(3.2)
(3.3)
where Li is the voter’s labor supply and ti is the income tax rate on group i.
The provision of the public good depends on the labor supply provided by each
group. Each voter chooses a utility-maximizing labor supply, taking the government’s
fiscal policy and the consumption of the other group as given. Substituting the voter's
budget and time constraints into the utility function gives her objective problem:
(3.4)
Taking the first-order condition and solving for the utility-maximizing labor supply yields
(3.5)
Labor supply is increasing in innate ability. Consequently, the rich supply more labor and
earn more income than the poor. Substituting in the budget and time constraints gives the
optimal Ci and Xi.

14

This specification is based on Persson and Tabellini (2000, 24).
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(3.6)

(3.7)
The government’s budget constraint is given by:
(3.8)

where si denotes a group’s population share.
Substituting the constraints into the utility function gives a voter from group i’s indirect
utility as a function of the tax rates.
(3.9)
where
Because labor supply is decreasing in the tax rate, the marginal revenue from each income
group is diminishing. The marginal revenue from one tax is not influenced by the other.
Consequently, the cross partial from the revenue function is zero. The pair of tax rates is
determined through an election in which two office-motivated political candidates, A and
B, simultaneously and noncooperatively propose their fiscal platforms. Voter i prefers
candidate A if
(3.10)
where

and

are the tax rates proposed by candidates A and B, respectively.

The parameter σ denotes the average relative charisma of candidate B and can be positive
or negative. 15 I assume that σ has a uniform distribution on

15

Voting behavior must include a component that is random from the perspective of the candidates for an
equilibrium platform to emerge. See Mueller (2003, 249-257).
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Given the distribution of σ, Candidate A’s expected vote share is given by
(3.11)
where Si is group i’s population share. Candidate A chooses tR and tP to maximize his
expected vote share. The first-order conditions are:
(3.12)

(3.13)
The parameter δ has dropped out because it is a multiplicative constant. It is apparent that
the politically-optimal rate for each tax equates the marginal revenue from that tax with
the marginal loss of expected political support attributable to that tax. Because candidate
B faces a symmetric problem, he offers the same platform. The outcome of the election is
determined by the distribution of σ, the average relative charisma of candidate B. 16
Equations (3.12) and (3.13) determine the politically-optimal tRA and tPA as
functions of the weight that each group places on the consumption of the other group
along with other parameters. One can show that an increase in the weight placed on the
consumption of group j by group i leads to a decrease in the politically-optimal tax rate
levied on group j while having zero effect on the politically-optimal tax rate levied on
group i. In states in which the average voter is relatively liberal, the weight placed on the
consumption of the rich by the poor is likely to be relatively light and/or the weight placed
16

The platform given by the solutions to equations (12) and (13) is an equilibrium platform provided that the
second-order condition for a maximum holds. Because the cross partials are zero, the second-order
condition holds if
The derivative of either of the first-order conditions with respect to ti can be written:
Thus, the politically-optimal fiscal platform is an equilibrium platform.
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on the consumption of the poor by the rich is likely to be relatively heavy. Thus, the
theoretical model suggests that tax structures should be relatively progressive in states in
which the average voter is relatively liberal. The analysis that follows gauges the
direction and magnitude of the impact of average voter liberalism on state and local tax
progressivity.
Empirical Approach
The analysis utilizes data on the combined state and local tax burdens for each
income quintile in each state provided by the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy
(1996, 2003, 2009). All three studies used the same methodology. The income quintiles
are specific to each state. The authors utilized data on a stratified random sample that
includes all household types and is statistically valid at the state level. The studies present
the average tax rates (i.e. the percentages of income paid to taxes) for each state-specific
income quintile for 1995, 2002 and 2007.17 The estimated burdens consist of burdens
imposed by personal and corporate income, general sales, property, cigarette, gasoline, and
beer taxes. The studies allow portions of certain tax burdens to be exported to nonresidents. None of the studies take tax importing into account. Corporate income,
property, and retail sales taxes levied on firms could be passed forward to in-state or outof-state consumers or passed backward to in-state or out-of-state capital owners and

17

The Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ) produced estimates for 1985 and 1991 in CTJ (1991). The study used a
different sampling strategy and different shifting assumptions than those used by Institute on Taxation and
Economic Policy (ITEP) (2003, 2009). Estimates for 1977 were provided by Phares (1980). While the
CTJ/ITEP studies were based on microsimulation approaches, Phares used aggregate state data to allocate
total tax burdens to income groups. Chernick (2005) pooled the Phares estimates with the CTJ estimates to
form a 3-year panel. I pooled the Chernick dataset with the CTJ/ITEP estimates, estimated the models
described in Section IV, and conducted the Chow test for each equation. The null hypothesis of parameter
constancy was rejected in every case, which suggests that the two panels should not be pooled. The results
based on the CTJ/ITEP estimates are presented here. Those based on Chernick’s data are omitted because of
the space constraint but are available upon request. When Chernick’s dataset is used, average voter and
government liberalism are statistically insignificant.
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workers. The methodology is described in detail in Appendix 2.
The empirical model can be summarized as follows:
(3.14)

where i and t are subscripts for the state and year, respectively. The subscript j denotes
neighboring states. Pit refers to one of three measures of state and local tax progressivity:
the top quintile's average tax rate as a percentage of that faced by the bottom quintile (Topto-Bottom %), the average tax rate faced by the top quintile as a percentage of that faced
by the middle quintile (Top-to-Middle %), the average tax rate faced by the middle quintile
as a percentage of that faced by the bottom quintile (Middle-to-Bottom %). Models of the
average tax rate faced by each income quintile were also estimated to determine how the
regressors affect the average tax rates on each income group. CLit and GLit denote the
average voter’s and the government’s liberalism, respectively. The vector Xit consists of
relevant state demographics. The vector Eit consists of measures of measures of potential
state tax exporting capacities. WPjt is the average tax variable of neighboring states or the
spatial lag of the dependent variable. Iit is a vector of state voting institutions. Fi and Yt
denote state and year fixed effects, respectively. The random error is denoted by εit.
I used a measure of ideology that was developed by Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and
Hansen (1998) (hereafter referred to as the BRFH measure). This measure has not been
used in previous studies of state and local tax progressivity. The authors used the average
of ratings of incumbent Congress members in each district by the Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA) and the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education (COPE)
to quantify ideology of the citizens. Berry et al assume that the ideological orientation of
state legislators is the same as that of their congressional counterparts. Additionally, they
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assume that a challenger’s ideology score is equal to the average score of all incumbents
in the state from the same party. Each electoral district’s ideology score is the weighted
average party ideology where the weights are each party’s vote share. From the district
scores, the authors calculate a state-level unweighted average. A higher score denotes
greater liberalism (Berry et al 1998).
Since it is based on congressional votes, the BRFH measure is potentially a more
valid measure of the average voter’s operational ideology than alternative measures that
have been previously used in this literature. The strength of the measure, however, is
limited by the extent to which political parties deviate from the platforms desired by
voters.18
If the ideologies of the political parties are not identical, then majority rule will
yield a government with an ideological orientation that may differ from that of the average
voter. A particular party’s share of political power increases if it wins the governorship.
For these reasons, the model includes the BRFH measure of government liberalism in
addition to the measure of citizen liberalism. To calculate their measure of government
liberalism, Berry and co-authors first assume that the minority party’s maximum share of
power is forty percent while the majority’s minimum share is sixty percent. If the
majority’s share of power exceeds sixty percent, then it is assumed to have complete
18

If voters merely choose “the lesser evil”, then the BRFH measure is a limited measure of voter ideology.
Another potential limitation of the measure is that it assigns equal weight to each voter. It is likely to be the
case that political influence varies. Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1999) found that the wealthy were
significantly more likely than the less well off to donate dollars and time to campaigns and participate in
protests. Thus, the weight that a voter’s utility receives may be directly-related to his or her income.
Improving upon the BRFH voter ideology measure along the margins described above presupposes the
availability of a survey dataset, with a state-representative sample, that reports respondents’ views of the
economic system, policy preferences, and demographic characteristics. The surveys utilized by Fong (2001)
and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) are representative only at the national level. The sample used by Erikson
et al (1993) is representative at the state-level. The limitations of their ideology measure are described in
Section II.
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control. The governor and the legislature are assumed to have equal power. The authors
assume that the ideological orientation of state officials (including the governor) is the
same as that of the state’s Congressional delegation, as measured by the ADA and COPE.
The authors estimate “government liberalism” by taking the weighted average of the
ideological scores of both houses of the legislature, where the weights are each party’s
effective power, and adding the governor’s ideology score. A higher value indicates a
greater degree of liberalism. The BRFH government liberalism measure does not
necessarily reflect the ideological orientation of the individual state legislators. Thus, the
validity of the measure depends on the degree of ideological homogeneity within each
party. 19 Because government liberalism is a function of average voter liberalism, I
included only the component of government liberalism that is not explained by average
voter liberalism. More specifically, I regressed government liberalism over average voter
liberalism, took the residual, and included the residual in the models instead of the raw
government liberalism measure. 20 I expect both average voter liberalism and the
government liberalism residual to be positively-related to state and local tax progressivity.
The models include measures of state demographic characteristics that may
influence voter demand for tax progressivity. Research conducted by social psychologists,
political scientists, and economists indicates that that people tend to be more generous
toward others who are more similar to them ethnically, racially, linguistically, etc. 21 Using
survey data, Luttmer (2001) finds that people are less likely to support welfare spending if

19

Erikson et al (1993) developed a measure of mean state “elite ideology” based on survey responses from
political party elites within each state. However, this measure dates back to the mid-1980’s.
20
Using the raw government liberalism measure does not substantially affect the results. Using the residual
instead simplifies the interpretation of the results since one is not required to take into account the indirect
effect of average voter liberalism on progressivity through its effect on government liberalism.
21
See Fong and Luttmer (2011) for a review of the literature.
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they live near welfare recipients of another race. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) find an
inverse relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and welfare spending among the U.S.
states. Hero (1994) does not find a relationship between ethnic heteroeneity and state and
local tax progressivity. However, the author did not control for state tax exporting
capacities or spatial dependence. I measure the ethnic congruence between the poor and
the non-poor by estimating the probability that two randomly-drawn individuals, one from
the poor population and the other from the non-poor population, are of the same ethnicity
(Ethnic Congruence). If we denote the proportion of the non-poor who are in ethnic group
k as

and the proportion of the poor who are from group k as

then

where k = (Hispanics, non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic African-Americans, other nonHispanic)
The “non-poor” group consists of individuals with household incomes above the state
median while the “poor” group consists of individuals with household incomes in the
bottom fifth of the state's income distribution. 22
The ethnic congruence measure does not account for variation in the amiability of
relations between ethnic groups. If greater diversity leads to greater contact between
individuals of different ethnic groups then it may actually increase support for
redistributive fiscal policies. Roch and Rushton (2008) examine the effects of racial
diversity and residential segregation on white voter support for an Alabama state
referendum that would have substantially increased the progressivity of the state's tax

22

Hero (1994) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) use a measure of ethnic fractionalization which is the
probability that two randomly-drawn individuals are of the same ethnicity. During the time period of this
study, the correlation between this measure and Ethnic Congruence is 0.94.
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structure. They find that white support for the measure at the county-level is significantly
and negatively-affected by the degree of segregation but insignificantly affected by the
African-American share of county population. Their results suggest that it is the degree of
tension between racial groups—and not racial diversity itself—that influences support for
redistributive fiscal policies. I use the state-level analog of the county-level measure used
in their study. Let be the proportion state i's white population living in census tract q and
let be the proportion of state i's non-whites living in census tract q. Then

If each census tract has the same proportion of white and non-white residents as the state
as a whole, then this segregation index equals zero. An index value of 100 indicates
complete segregation. The measure can be interpreted as the proportion of the state's nonwhite population who would need to move to a different tract in order to reduce
segregation to zero.23 As was mentioned above, greater diversity may increase support for
redistributive fiscal policy by increasing contact between different ethnic groups.
However, individuals who are already comfortable with other ethnic groups may choose to
live among them. Regardless of whether residential segregation reinforces or reflects
animosity between ethnic groups, it can be viewed as a proxy for the degree of ethnic
group tension. The African-American share of state population is included in the models
because Fong (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) find that African-Americans tend
to be more supportive of redistribution.
23

I obtained the segregation data from William H. Frey and the University of Michigan Social Science Data
Analysis Network. The authors calculated the segregation index from 1990 and 2000 decennial Census data
and from American Community Survey data pooled from 2005 to 2009. I used the estimates derived from
ACS data for 2007 and produced estimates for 1995 and 2002 with linear interpolation. The authors
calculated the indices for white-African -American, white-Hispanic, and white-Asian segregation. I use a
weighted average of these indices where the weights are each non-white group's share of the sum of the
state's Hispanic, non-Hispanic African-American, and Asian populations.
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The model also includes the percentage of a state’s population age sixty-five or
older. This group is likely to have a high consumption-to-income ratio. All else equal, it
should prefer greater reliance on income taxes relative to consumption taxes. Thus, I
expect the elderly population share to be associated with a progressive distribution of tax
burdens. The model includes the percentage of workers who are labor union members
since labor unions tend to promote redistributive fiscal policies. 24 I also control for
income inequality, measured with the ratio between the mean and median household
incomes, since a relatively high degree of inequality may create political pressure for
redistribution (Hettich and Winer 1999; Chernick 2005). Numerous empirical studies of
the political economy of subnational tax and spending policies control for per-capita
income and the poverty. 25 Thus, those variables are controlled in the models estimated
here.
The equations include measures of a state’s capacity to export taxes to
nonresidents via the federal deductibility of state and local taxes and interstate commerce.
The federal deductibility offset for residents is measured with the net-of-federaldeductibility price of $1 of deductible state and local taxes. The method for calculating the
tax price was described in Chapter 2. Since high-income households are more likely to
itemize and tend to face relatively high federal tax rates, deductibility lowers the political
costs associated with taxing these households, ceteris paribus. Thus, I expect the tax price
measure to be positively-related to the tax progressivity measures. Feldstein and Metcalf
(1987) make a strong case for the possibility that the tax price is subject to reverse

24
25

See Radcliff and Saiz (1998)
See Rork (2003), and Fletcher and Murray (2006).
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causation. 26 To address this issue, I used a GMM model which is described in detail in the
next subsection.
The models include proxies for a state’s capacity to export taxes through interstate
commerce. The ratio between state retail sales per-capita and the national average (Sales
Activity Index) is a proxy for the importance of tourism in a state’s economy. Tourism
provides opportunities for consumption tax exporting, which can influence state and local
tax progressivity in two ways. Consumption tax exporting opportunities may encourage
reliance on the sales and excise taxes, which reduce progressivity. However, the fact that
nonresidents bear some of the burden allows governments to raise a given amount of
revenue with a lower consumption tax rates. Tourism may also encourage greater reliance
on license fees, which may align the benefits obtained by tourists more closely with the
costs associated with providing the public services that they utilize. 27 For these reasons,
the expected sign on the Sales Activity Index is ambiguous. The presence of mineral
resource industries can also provide opportunities for states to shift taxes to nonresidents,
either through the sale of these goods outside of the state or through backwards shifting to
investors. 28 However, firms involved in these industries pay sales, corporate income, and
property taxes. Portions of all of these taxes could potentially be exported so it is unclear
how the importance of mineral resources in a state’s economy should influence state and
local tax structure.
26

If income tax rates are relatively high in a particular state, then more taxpayers are likely to itemize. This
would cause a downward bias. Upward bias is also possible since deductions of state and local taxes lower
taxable income which leads to lower federal tax rates for itemizers.
27
Gade and Adkins (1990) found that tourism had a positive impact on license fee reliance but a negative
impact on income and general sales tax reliance. Metcalf (1993) found evidence of a positive relationship
between tourism and general sales tax reliance. Tourism did not appear to have a significant effect on license
fees, according to his estimates.
28
If a state dominates a natural resource market, then it may be able to shift a portion of its business taxes
forward to nonresident consumers. Otherwise, any exporting of these taxes that occurs will be backwards to
nonresident investors.
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The politically-optimal tax structure for a particular state may be influenced by the
tax structures adopted by its neighbors. WPjt denotes the weighted average tax variable of
state i’s neighbors, or the spatial lag of the tax variable. I experimented with two
weighting matrices that are frequently used in the literature: the simple contiguity matrix
and the population-weighted contiguity matrix. The simple contiguity matrix assigns a
weight of 1/n to each neighboring state, where n equals the number of neighbors, and a
weight of zero to non-neighboring states. It calculates the unweighted average tax rate of
neighboring states. With the population-weighted contiguity matrix, the tax variable of
each neighbor is weighted by its share of the total population of neighboring states since a
state may be more (less) responsive to the tax policies imposed by their larger (smaller)
neighbors. As with the simple contiguity matrix, non-neighbors receive a weight of
zero.29 The population weights are based on state population averaged across the sample
period. As with all models of strategic interaction between governments, the sign on the
spatial lag is theoretically ambiguous (see Brueckner and Saavedra 2001; Rork 2003).
Since the tax structure adopted by state i may influence those adopted by neighboring
states, WPjt will be treated as endogenous.
The models control for year fixed effects. State fixed effects are likely to be
relevant. However, the ratio between the average within standard deviation of each tax
variable and its mean tends to be very small (see Table 1), meaning that state tax structures
29

The literature on fiscal competition includes studies that use weighting matrices based on economic or
demographic similarity or on population flows. The use of such weighting matrices may yield spurious
results due to correlation between the fiscal variables and the elements of the weighting matrix (Anselin
2001, Rork and Wagner 2012). The exogeneity of the simple contiguity weights is explicit. The populationweighted contiguity weights are exogenous provided that state and local tax structures are not significantlycorrelated with state population. To gauge the strength of this potential source of bias, I calculated the
correlation between the progressivity ratios in each year and state population averaged across the sample
period. The average correlations across the sample period for the Top-to-Bottom, Top-to-Middle, and
Middle-to-Bottom ratios were -0.127, 0.027, and -0.233, respectively. The highest correlation that I obtained
for a particular year was 0.311 for the Middle-to-Bottom Ratio.
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changed little during this period. Thus, most of the variation resulted from variation
between states. To allow the between variation to play a greater role in the analysis, I used
indicator variables for the nine Census divisions (with New England as the reference
category) instead of state fixed effects. The results must be interpreted with caution since
the regressors may be correlated with the state fixed effects and the Census division
indicators may not completely absorb states’ time-invariant, unobserved characteristics. 30
Table 1 presents summary statistics. The data sources are presented in Appendix 1.
Prior to estimating the above model, there are econometric issues that need to be
addressed. There are two potentially endogenous variables: the net-of-deductibility price
of deductible state and local taxes and the neighbors’ weighted average tax burden
measure. To address the potential endogeneity, I used a generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator with clustering by state. 31 ,32 I used three instruments for the tax price

30

I estimated the models with the GMM fixed effects estimator and found that the fitted values and the
estimates of the fixed effects were generally correlated. This suggests correlation between the state fixed
effects and at least one of the regressors. When the simple contiguity spatial weights are used, the Census
division indicators explain 30 to 51 percent of the variation in the state fixed effects estimates from each of
the eight equations. When the population-weighted contiguity matrix is used, the division indicators explain
30 to 63 percent of the variation in the state fixed effects estimates. Regardless of the spatial weighting
matrix utilized, the division indicators explain at least 40 percent of the variation in the state fixed effects
estimates in 6 out of 8 of the tax equations. The time-invariant state heterogeneity that remains in the error
term may be correlated with at least one of the regressors. Consequently, the estimates presented here must
be interpreted with caution.
31
The two-stage least squares estimator could also be utilized since it provides consistent estimates when at
least one regressor is endogenous. However, the generalized method of moments estimator is more efficient
when the disturbance is heteroskedastic. I conducted the Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
described by Greene (2003, 323-324). The test rejected the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity with every
equation.
32
I considered the possibility that spatial autocorrelation is present in the error term. It can be caused by
measurement error or by unobserved factors affecting a state’s tax rates that are related across states (Anselin
1988). Let M denote the weighting matrix that applies weights to the residuals of all other states. If spatial
autocorrelation exists, then the estimates will be inefficient and the test statistics will be invalid. I modeled
M as an inverse-distance weighting matrix with a decay factor of 2 and a distance threshold beyond which
spatial autocorrelation is assumed to be zero.

Thus, states that are closer in terms of distance between Census state population centers get more
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measure: its tenth-order lag, the percentage of household heads who are married, and the
average number of children per household. The tenth-order lag of the tax price measure
should be close enough to the current value but a deep enough lag to be uncorrelated with
the error term. Edmiston and Spong (2012) find that married households and households
with children were more likely to itemize. Thus, I expect the percentage of householders
who are married and the average number of children per household to be inversely-related
to the tax price. I do not expect these variables to be directly related to state and local tax
progressivity.
Following Rork (2003) and Fletcher and Murray (2006), I used the spatial lags of
the exogenous regressors as instruments for the spatial lag of the own-state’s tax measure.
These are valid instruments provided that they are jointly correlated with the spatial lag of
the own-state tax variable, uncorrelated with own-state unobservables, and not directlyrelated to the own-state tax variable. 33 I also included the tenth-order lag of the average
income tax share of own-source revenue for neighboring states.
The instruments satisfy two criteria: from Wald tests, I found that the instruments
are jointly correlated with the endogenous regressors 34; in overidentification tests, I failed
to reject the joint exogeneity of the surfeit of instruments. These tests provide evidence of
the validity of the instruments.
To determine whether the use of GMM was justified, I carried out the Durbin-Wuweight. With the decay term equal to 2, states that are further away get much less weight than states that are
relatively close. States that are more than 1,036 statute miles away are assumed not to matter. The threshold
of 1,036 miles was chosen because it is the mean distance between states in the sample period. Following
Anselin and Kelejian (1997), I conducted Moran’s I test for the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the
GMM residuals from each of the three equations. The null hypothesis of zero spatial autocorrelation was not
rejected for any of the equations. Thus, the test statistics presented below should be reliable.
33
See Kelejian and Robinson (1993).
34
I also conducted the Angrist-Pischke (2008) underidentification test for each endogenous variable in each
equation. The null hypothesis of underidentification was rejected at the 99.9 percent confidence level in
every case.
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Hausman endogeneity test. The null hypothesis of exogeneity was rejected at the 95
percent confidence level for all three of the progressivity ratio equations. Thus, the
discussion of the results will focus on the GMM estimates.
Results
Table 3.2 presents the GMM regression results for the factors that influence the
progressivity of state and local taxes. Regardless of which spatial weighting matrix is
used, average voter liberalism is positively and significantly related to the middle
quintile's average tax rate as a percentage of that of the bottom quintile (Middle-to-Bottom
%). In other words, there is robust evidence of a positive relationship between average
voter liberalism and progressivity toward the low end of the income distribution. It is also
positively-related to the average tax rate of the top quintile as a percentage of that of the
bottom quintile (Top-to-Bottom %). However, the effect is statistically-significant only
when the simple contiguity spatial weights are used. Table 3.5 presents the effects of one
standard deviation increases in key regressors on the three progressivity measures. When
average voter liberalism is statistically-significant, the effect of an increase in that variable
of one standard deviation falls between three and four percent of the mean value of the
progressivity measure. Thus, it appears that the effects of average voter liberalism on state
and local tax progressivity are economically-insignificant.35,36 The estimated effects may
have been larger if differences in political influence among voters could have been taken
35

I also estimated the equations with the Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) measure of average liberalism.
The coefficient on this measure is significant only in the equation for the Middle-to-Bottom Ratio. The
magnitude of the effect is not substantially different from that of the BRFH voter liberalism measure. These
results are available from the author upon request.
36
Replacing Census division fixed effects with state fixed effects has a significant impact on the results.
When state fixed effects are included, average voter liberalism is insignificant in all three of the
progressivity equations. It has a negative sign in the Top-to-Bottom and Top-to-Middle Ratio equations and a
positive sign in the Middle-to-Bottom Ratio equation. These results may be attributable to the low degree of
within-variation in average voter liberalism. Over the time period covered by this study, the average within
variation in average voter liberalism was equal to 11 percent of the mean.
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into account. The BRFH measure of average voter liberalism is a voter populationweighted average. Political influence may be positively-correlated with wealth. If this
tends to be the case, then an income-weighted average ideology measure may more
accurately gauge the influence of voter ideology on state and local tax progressivity.
Government liberalism does not appear to be a significant determinant of progressivity. 37
State ethnic demographics appear to significantly influence the distribution of tax
burdens across income groups. The ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor
is significantly and positively-related to all three progressivity measures. 38,39 These results
are at odds with those obtained by Hero(1994), who did not find a significant relationship
between ethnic heterogeneity and state and local tax progressivity. It is important to note
that Hero did not control for tax exporting capacities and spatial dependence. I obtain
results that are similar to his when I exclude the tax exporting variables and the spatial lag
(these results are available upon request). I find that both the tax price measure and the
Sales Activity Index are significantly correlated with Ethnic Congruence. 40 This may
explain the discrepancy between the two analyses. Excluding the tax exporting variables
and the spatial lag may produce biased results.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the GMM estimates of the average tax rate equations
estimated with each of the spatial weighting matrices. These estimates allow us to relate
37

The raw government liberalism measure is insignificant even when average voter liberalism is excluded.
Excluding government liberalism or the residual measure does not substantially affect the coefficient on
average voter liberalism.
38
Excluding average voter liberalism from the models does not substantially change the coefficient on ethnic
homogeneity and vice versa.
39
When state fixed effects are used, the coefficient on Ethnic Congruence is positively-related to the Top-toBottom %. The coefficient is about a third of the size of the coefficient that is obtained when the Census
division fixed effects are used. It is only statistically significant when the population-weighted contiguity
weights are used. It is insignificant in the equations for the other two progressivity measures. These results
may be attributable to the low within-state variation in Ethnic Congruence. The average within standard
deviation is equal to about seven percent of the mean.
40
Both correlation coefficients are around 0.2.
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the effects on the progressivity measures to effects on each income group. We see that
Ethnic Congruence is inversely-related to the average tax rate imposed on the bottom
quintile and positively-related to average tax rate faced by the top quintile. These results
suggest that regressive taxation is more politically-costly when there is greater ethnic
congruence between the poor and the non-poor. Wealthy voters may get less disutility
from paying taxes when members of their own ethnic group(s) constitute a large share of
the beneficiaries. A one standard-deviation increase in ethnic homogeneity is predicted to
increase the Top-to-Bottom % by about fifteen percent regardless of which spatial
weighting matrix is used. The effect of a one-standard deviation increase in Ethnic
Congruence on the Middle-to-Bottom % is equal to around eleven percent of the mean of
that progressivity measure with both specifications of the spatial lag. The effect is a little
over three times that of average voter liberalism.
The degree of tension between ethnic groups, measured with an index of
residential segregation, also appears to be significantly-associated with state and local tax
progressivity. A one-standard deviation increase in residential segregation is associated
with a reduction in the Top-to-Bottom % of roughly ten percent. It is also inversely-related
to the other two progressivity measures but the effects are smaller in magnitude. The
residential segregation index is positively-related to the average tax rates faced by all five
income quintiles. However, the effects are larger for lower income groups. These results
suggest that greater tension between ethnic groups is associated with higher state and local
expenditures as a share of state personal income but that these expenditures are financed
with regressive tax structures. Animosity between ethnic groups may be directly-related
to spending on law enforcement and corrections. However, an examination of the effects
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of ethnic group tension on the composition of subnational government expenditures is
beyond the scope of this study.
Like Chernick (2005), I find that the progressivity of neighboring states is
inversely related to own-state progressivity. The spatial lag is significantly and negatively
related to all three of the progressivity equations. This means that if neighbors’ tax
structures become less (more) progressive on average, then a particular state’s tax
structure will become more (less) progressive. These results may reflect the development
of tax havens within regions. 41 Looking at Table 3.5, we see the effects of tax competition
on progressivity are modest in magnitude regardless of which spatial weighting matrix is
used.
A state’s capacity to export taxes through federal deductibility has a statistically
and economically significant impact on state and local progressivity, gross of the
deductibility offset. By offsetting the political and economic costs associated with state
and local taxes on the wealthy, federal deductibility encourages subnational governments
to adopt more progressive tax policies, ceteris paribus. The size of the offset is decreasing
in the net-of-deductibility cost of one dollar of a deductible tax, which is given by
equation (2) or (3) in Chapter 2, depending on whether a state’s income tax system allows
deduction of federal income taxes. The net-of-federal-deductibility price of deductible
state and local taxes is significant and negative in all three of the progressivity equations. 42

41

When state fixed effects are included, the spatial lag has a positive sign in the equations for the Top-toMiddle and Middle-to-Bottom ratios, which suggests that long-standing differences in the tax structures of
contiguous states may be eroding (I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this interpretation). These
effects may have been driven by increased competition for firms and high-income households and/or by
yardstick competition. Another possible explanation is that the convergence of per-capita incomes among
states brought about by movement of production factors has promoted the convergence of government
expenditures and tax structures (Scully 1989; Annala 2003; Coughlin, Garrett, and Hernandez-Murillo
2007).
42
When state fixed effects are included, the tax price appears to be positively-related to progressivity. This
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These findings are consistent with those obtained by Chernick (1992, 2005). An increase
in the net-of-deductibility price of deductible state and local taxes of one standard
deviation is predicted to prompt a reduction in the Top-to-Bottom % equal to
approximately twenty-five percent of the mean of that mean. These results suggest that
the indirect subsidy offered by deductibility has been a strong motivator for the adoption
of progressive tax structures.
Tax exporting capacities arising from interstate state commerce influence the
distribution of subnational tax burdens. The Sales Activity Index is inversely-related to the
Top-to-Bottom % and the Top-to-Middle % with both specifications of the spatial lag. The
magnitude of the effects are modest. It appears that the prominence of tourism in a state's
economy promotes the use of regressive tax structures. Increases in the mining share of
state private sector GDP are associated with small decreases in the Top-to-Middle %.
Discussion
The survey-based research conducted by Fong (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara
(2003) suggests that citizens’ preferences for redistribution are significantly affected by
conceptions of fairness even when variables reflecting the extent to which they are likely
to benefit financially from redistributive policies are held constant. Voters’ conceptions of
fairness are likely to be grounded in established ideologies. This study compares the
effects of ideology to the effects of other factors that constrain state and local
policymakers. I find that the impact of average voter liberalism is statistically significant
and positive. However, the effects are small in magnitude. These results may reflect
measurement error. Thus, continued experimentation with the measurement of voter

counterintuitive result may attributable to the low degree of within-variation in the tax price, which was
equal to about 1 percent of the mean during the time period studied.
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ideology may yield valuable results.
The ethnic congruence between the poor and non-poor and the degree of tension
between ethnic groups appear to have substantial impacts on state and local tax
progressivity. When the poor and non-poor tend to be of the same ethnicity, state and
local governments tend to utilize tax structures that are more progressive, ceteris paribus.
The amiability of ethnic group relations, measured with an index of ethnic residential
segregation, is inversely-related to progressivity. Thus, the downward pressure on support
for progressive taxation generated by ethnic dissimilarity between the poor and non-poor
may be offset by greater congeniality between ethnic groups. These results indicate that
voter preferences concerning tax progressivity are not completely determined by narrow
self-interest. Voters appear to consider the impacts of state and local fiscal policies on
others. However, the weight that the non-poor attach to the well-being of the poor appears
to be substantially shaped by ethnic group loyalty and by the degree of tension between
ethnic groups. The fact that these variables are significant even with average voter
liberalism held constant suggests that the interaction between state ethnic demographics
and voter altruism may not be captured by measures of general voter ideology.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Overall Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Top-to-Bottom %

76.7

20.2

31.2

130.1

Top-to-Middle %

85

13.9

38.1

115.2

Middle-to-Bottom %
Q1 Rate
Q2 Rate

89.2
10.796
9.807

13.8
2.128
1.603

61
4.7
4.7

93.7
17.6
14.3

Q3 Rate

9.458

1.532

4.8

14.3

Q4 Rate

9.071

1.603

4.3

14.6

Q5 Rate

8.059

1.869

3.013

13.833

Average Voter Liberalism

50.12

15.8

8.45

95.972

Government Liberalism Residual

0

23.673

-45.566

49.911

Ethnic Congruence

0.593

0.171

0.312

0.967

Residential Segregation Index

53.503

10.724

29.052

75.118

African American

10.527

9.559

0.35

37.028

Age 65+

12.799

1.614

8.593

18.524

Union Density

11.933

5.463

3

27.9

Per-Capita Income ($1,000)

31.883

5.947

20.936

52.728

Mining

2.531

5.269

1.189

0.314

Marriage Rate

53.203

3.608

2.275

45.166

Number of Children Per Household

0.704

0.092

0.05

0.516
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Table 3.2: Pooled GMM Estimates for the Progressivity Ratio Equations

Average Voter Lib.
Gov. Lib. Residual
Ethnic Congruence
Segregation Index
African American
Age 65 +
Union Density
Per-Capita Inc.
Income Inequality
Poverty
Tax Price
Sales Activity
Index
Mining
Neighbors'
Progressivity
2002
2007
Constant
R-Squared
N
p-values in
parentheses
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001

(1)
(2)
(3)
Top-toTop-toMiddle-toBottom %
Middle %
Bottom %
With Simple Contiguity Spatial Weights
0.177*
0.0535
0.186***
(0.026)
(0.385)
(0.000)
-0.0114
-0.00709
-0.0214
(0.772)
(0.809)
(0.413)
69.72***
20.96***
56.72***
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
-0.731***
-0.446***
-0.303**
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.005)
0.251
-0.106
0.341**
(0.123)
(0.327)
(0.001)
-0.478
0.191
-0.612
(0.635)
(0.749)
(0.339)
0.119
0.193
-0.123
(0.705)
(0.360)
(0.565)
-0.288
-0.446
-0.241
(0.563)
(0.103)
(0.552)
-18.91
-7.525
-2.625
(0.310)
(0.438)
(0.864)
2.078***
0.893***
1.647***
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
-1000.1***
-554.9***
-719.6***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

(4)
(5)
(6)
Top-toTop-toMiddle-toBottom %
Middle %
Bottom %
With Population Weights
0.121
0.0236
0.149*
(0.223)
(0.716)
(0.017)
-0.0194
-0.0174
-0.0309
(0.694)
(0.559)
(0.298)
68.80***
19.40**
58.52***
(0.000)
(0.004)
(0.000)
-0.796***
-0.513***
-0.367**
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.002)
-0.0173
-0.212
0.227*
(0.927)
(0.061)
(0.046)
-1.270
0.0679
-0.770
(0.185)
(0.908)
(0.245)
0.0422
0.286
-0.268
(0.898)
(0.149)
(0.266)
0.402
-0.211
0.371
(0.500)
(0.482)
(0.478)
-17.30
-8.323
-3.192
(0.371)
(0.421)
(0.835)
2.595***
1.136***
1.857***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-892.1***
-474.3***
-681.9***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

-0.402***
(0.000)
-0.298
(0.113)

-0.252***
(0.000)
-0.293*
(0.034)

-0.152
(0.129)
0.131
(0.265)

-0.432***
(0.000)
-0.682**
(0.002)

-0.292***
(0.000)
-0.549***
(0.000)

-0.199*
(0.048)
-0.103
(0.453)

-0.635***
(0.000)
2.600
(0.206)
11.88*
(0.021)
1084.4***
(0.000)
0.62
144

-0.658***
(0.000)
-7.033***
(0.000)
-9.366*
(0.016)
706.5***
(0.000)
0.64
144

-0.654***
(0.000)
10.03***
(0.000)
26.06***
(0.000)
784.3***
(0.000)
0.57
144

-0.510***
(0.001)
-1.209
(0.621)
9.931
(0.105)
971.9***
(0.000)
0/60
144

-0.469***
(0.001)
-6.778***
(0.000)
-6.953
(0.063)
617.9***
(0.000)
0.62
144

-0.437*
(0.013)
4.490*
(0.016)
19.83***
(0.000)
726.6***
(0.000)
0.56
144
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Table 3.3: Pooled GMM Estimates of the Average Tax Rate Equations Using the
Simple Contiguity Spatial Weights

Average Voter Liberalism
Government Lib. Residual
Ethnic Congruence
Residential Segregation Index
African American
Age 65 +
Union Density
Per-Capita Income ($1,000)
Income Inequality
Poverty
Tax Price
Sales Activity Index
Mining
Neighbors' Tax Rate
2002
2007
Constant
R-Squared
N

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Q1 Rate
-0.011
(0.288)
0.007
(0.150)
-4.431**
(0.004)
0.095***
(0.000)
-0.054*
(0.035)
-0.125
(0.345)
0.022
(0.599)
0.052
(0.251)
-0.343
(0.842)
0.007
(0.917)
61.79***
(0.000)
-0.029*
(0.012)
-0.076**
(0.009)
-0.053
(0.728)
-0.450
(0.192)
-1.864***
(0.000)
-42.54***
(0.001)
0.46
144

Q2 Rate
0.009
(0.217)
0.007
(0.051)
0.261
(0.834)
0.071***
(0.000)
-0.013
(0.596)
-0.031
(0.757)
0.001
(0.977)
-0.027
(0.489)
0.076
(0.954)
0.096*
(0.021)
-7.242
(0.618)
-0.022
(0.052)
-0.053
(0.058)
-0.003
(0.984)
0.265
(0.228)
0.056
(0.884)
14.10
(0.308)
0.42
144

Q3 Rate
0.015
(0.081)
0.002
(0.593)
1.480
(0.243)
0.057***
(0.000)
-0.020
(0.361)
-0.198*
(0.035)
-0.021
(0.538)
-0.076
(0.077)
-0.806
(0.450)
0.181***
(0.000)
-39.69**
(0.003)
-0.018
(0.058)
-0.023
(0.401)
-0.164
(0.281)
0.390*
(0.036)
1.018**
(0.006)
49.28***
(0.000)
0.51
144

Q4 Rate
0.006
(0.365)
-0.001
(0.733)
2.442
(0.052)
0.051***
(0.000)
-0.021
(0.304)
-0.201**
(0.003)
0.005
(0.859)
-0.077
(0.065)
-1.081
(0.256)
0.207***
(0.000)
-59.49***
(0.000)
-0.027**
(0.004)
-0.027
(0.296)
-0.323*
(0.015)
0.112
(0.562)
1.290***
(0.000)
69.82***
(0.000)
0.66
144

Q5 Rate
0.015*
(0.037)
0.003
(0.201)
2.320*
(0.036)
0.025*
(0.039)
-0.043*
(0.014)
-0.188***
(0.000)
0.006
(0.818)
-0.137***
(0.000)
-1.474
(0.213)
0.243***
(0.000)
-87.75***
(0.000)
-0.032***
(0.000)
0.003
(0.897)
-0.453***
(0.000)
-0.063
(0.769)
0.507
(0.128)
99.52***
(0.000)
0.75
144

p-values in parentheses
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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Table 3.4: Pooled GMM Estimates of the Average Tax Rate Equations Using the
Population-Weighted Contiguity Spatial Weights
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Q1 Rate
-0.011
(0.288)
0.007
(0.150)
-4.431**
(0.004)
0.095***
(0.000)
-0.054*
(0.035)
-0.125
(0.345)
0.022
(0.599)
0.052
(0.251)
-0.343
(0.842)
0.007
(0.917)
61.79***
(0.000)
-0.029*
(0.012)
-0.076**
(0.009)
-0.053
(0.728)
-0.450
(0.192)
-1.864***
(0.000)
-42.54***
(0.001)

Q2 Rate
0.009
(0.217)
0.007
(0.051)
0.261
(0.834)
0.071***
(0.000)
-0.013
(0.596)
-0.031
(0.757)
0.001
(0.977)
-0.027
(0.489)
0.076
(0.954)
0.096*
(0.021)
-7.242
(0.618)
-0.022
(0.052)
-0.053
(0.058)
-0.003
(0.984)
0.265
(0.228)
0.056
(0.884)
14.10
(0.308)

Q3 Rate
0.015
(0.081)
0.002
(0.593)
1.480
(0.243)
0.057***
(0.000)
-0.020
(0.361)
-0.198*
(0.035)
-0.021
(0.538)
-0.076
(0.077)
-0.806
(0.450)
0.181***
(0.000)
-39.69**
(0.003)
-0.018
(0.058)
-0.023
(0.401)
-0.164
(0.281)
0.390*
(0.036)
1.018**
(0.006)
49.28***
(0.000)

Q4 Rate
0.006
(0.365)
-0.001
(0.733)
2.442
(0.052)
0.051***
(0.000)
-0.021
(0.304)
-0.201**
(0.003)
0.005
(0.859)
-0.077
(0.065)
-1.081
(0.256)
0.207***
(0.000)
-59.49***
(0.000)
-0.027**
(0.004)
-0.027
(0.296)
-0.323*
(0.015)
0.112
(0.562)
1.290***
(0.000)
69.82***
(0.000)

Q5 Rate
0.015*
(0.037)
0.003
(0.201)
2.320*
(0.036)
0.025*
(0.039)
-0.043*
(0.014)
-0.188***
(0.000)
0.006
(0.818)
-0.137***
(0.000)
-1.474
(0.213)
0.243***
(0.000)
-87.75***
(0.000)
-0.032***
(0.000)
0.003
(0.897)
-0.453***
(0.000)
-0.063
(0.769)
0.507
(0.128)
99.52***
(0.000)

R-Squared

0.46

0.42

0.51

0.66

0.75

N

144

144

144

144

144

Average Voter Liberalism
Government Lib. Residual
Ethnic Congruence
Residential Segregation Index
African American
Age 65 +
Union Density
Per-Capita Income ($1,000)
Income Inequality
Poverty
Tax Price
Sales Activity Index
Mining
Neighbors' Tax Rate
2002
2007
Constant

p-values in parentheses
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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Table 3.5: Summary of the Magnitude of Key Regressors on State and Local Tax
Progressivity
With Simple Contiguity Spatial Weighting Matrix
Top-to-Bottom %
Effect of
%
std. dev.
Change
Increase
from the
mean

Top-to-Middle %
Effect of
% Change
std. dev.
from the
increase
mean

Middle-to-Bottom %
Effect of
%
std. dev.
Change
Increase
from
the
mean
2.98***
3.35
9.64***
10.83
-3.24**
-3.64
-14.4***
-16.18
-1.98
-2.24
-0.7
-0.78

Average Voter Lib.
2.88*
3.75
0.8
0.94
Ethnic Congruence
11.85***
15.45
3.56***
4.19
Segregation Index
-7.82***
-10.19
-4.77***
-5.61
Tax Price
-20***
-26.08
-11.1
-13.08
Sales Activity Index
-5.23***
-6.82
-3.3***
-3.88
Mining
-1.61
-2.09
-1.57*
-1.85
Neighbors’
Progressivity
-6.31***
-8.21
-5.39***
-6.34
-4.96***
-5.62
With Population-Weighted Contiguity Spatial Weighting Matrix
Top-to-Bottom %
Top-to-Middle %
Middle-to-Bottom %
Effect of
%
Effect of
% Change
Effect of
%
std. dev.
Change
std. dev.
from the
std. dev.
Change
Increase
from the
increase
mean
Increase
from
mean
the
mean
Average Voter
Liberalism
1.92
2.5
0.32
0.38
2.4*
3.13
Ethnic Congruence
11.7***
15.25
3.29***
3.88
9.95***
11.18
Residential
Segregation Index
-8.52***
-11.11
-5.49***
-6.46
-3.93**
-4.42
Tax Price
17.84***
-23.21
-9.48***
-11.15
-13.64***
-15.33
Sales Activity Index
-5.62***
-7.3
-3.79***
-4.46
-2.59*
-2.91
Mining
-3.66***
-4.77
-2.94***
-3.46
-0.55
-0.62
Neighbors’
Progressivity
-6.12***
-7.98
-4.46***
-5.25
-4.17*
-4.69
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001

Note: the significance stars are based on the GMM coefficients from Table 2.
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Chapter 4:

Tax Exporting and the Business Share of Sales Tax Levies

The sales tax is an important component of state tax systems and a nontrivial
revenue source for many local governments. In 2009, state governments obtained roughly
one-third of their tax revenue from the sales tax. In the same year, sales taxes provided
about twelve percent of local tax revenue. Economic analysis provides some support for
the use of a consumption tax over the income tax, at least on efficiency grounds. The
personal income tax creates disincentives to earn both labor and investment income while
the consumption tax only creates a disincentive to earn labor income. In these analyses,
the consumption tax is typically modeled as a tax that falls only on final consumption
purchases. 43 The sales taxes that are utilized by most state and many local governments
are actually hybrids of a tax on final consumption and a business tax. A substantial
proportion of state and local sales tax revenue is garnered from non-labor business input
purchases. In 2008, among the forty-five states that utilize the sales tax, the percentage of
sales tax revenue from business input purchases was approximately forty percent on
average, ranging from twenty-seven percent in West Virginia to fifty-nine percent in
Louisiana. In 2008, sales taxes garnered from business input purchases constituted
twenty-two percent of total state and local business tax levies on average. They were the
second largest component behind the property tax, which constituted about thirty-six
percent (Cline et al 2009). The extensive taxation of business inputs may hinder
efficiency by discouraging production in a particular state or by encouraging vertical
integration among firms. If firms are able to pass taxes on inputs forward to consumers,
then statutory exemptions of final consumption goods from the sales base, such as the

43

See Rosen (2005, 473-500) for a discussion of the economic costs of income and consumption taxes.
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exemption for groceries, may be offset.
If the taxation of business input purchases potentially has such adverse effects,
then why do governments do it? The incidence of taxes levied on firms is likely to be less
apparent to voters than taxes that are levied on them directly. The political costs of taxing
business input purchases may be relatively low because of low burden salience and also
due to tax exporting opportunities. Depending on the mobility of capital in a particular
state, taxes on input purchases may be passed backward to investors, many of whom may
be nonresidents. Corporations can deduct state and local taxes, including sales taxes on
input purchases, from their taxable income under the federal corporate income tax.
Proprietors can do the same under the federal personal income tax. Both deductibility
provisions enable state and local governments to shift portions of their business tax
burdens to taxpayers at the national level. The political efficacy of taxing firms is likely to
depend not just on a state’s capacity to export taxes on firms but also on its capacity to
export personal taxes levied directly on households, such as personal income taxes, taxes
on residential property, and on retail purchases by consumers. Household filers who take
itemized deductions when filing federal income tax returns can deduct certain personal
taxes but they cannot deduct taxes that are passed onto them by firms. Reductions in the
value of this particular deductibility offset brought about, for example, by reductions in
federal income tax rates, could encourage subnational governments to reduce deductible
personal taxes. These tax reductions may be accompanied by a reduction in public
expenditure. However, governments could recoup revenue lost to reductions in deductible
taxes on households by increasing taxes on firms.
Fletcher and Murray (2006) is the only previous study that examined the
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determinants of sales tax bases. The authors focused on tax competition and did not
examine the impacts of tax exporting on state sales tax base choices. The analysis
presented here is the first that examines the relationship between tax exporting and state
and local sales taxes levied on business input purchases. I find no evidence that suggests
that the exportability of taxes on firms is positively-related to sales tax levies on business
inputs. I find robust evidence that suggests that the federal deductibility offset provided
for deductible personal taxes is inversely-related to these levies. On average, the estimates
indicate that the elimination of this particular federal deductibility offset would lead to a
significant increase in state and local sales tax levies on business input purchases, ceteris
paribus. This particular offset does not appear to have a significant impact on consumer
sales tax levies. Overall, the results provide a compelling example of the influence that
federal tax policy exercises over state and local tax policy.
Background
Taxation of business input purchases has been a prominent feature of the state and
local sales tax since the diffusion of sales tax usage began in the 1930s. The level of sales
tax revenues on business inputs in a state depends on both the sales tax rates levied on
business input purchases as well as the range of business inputs included in the sales tax
base. All states exempt purchases of inventory for resale. 44,45 Materials that are
components of the final product or are elements of processing or fabrication are exempt in
all but one state— Hawaii—which taxes those items at reduced rates. Raw materials used
in research and development are taxed by all but nine of the sales-taxing states. 46 Utilities

44

Hawaii levies a reduced rate wholesale tax as part of its General Excise Tax.
The state sales tax information detailed in this discussion was taken from Research Institute of America
(2011).
46
Those states are Arizona, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Vermont,
and Virginia. In a few other states, exemptions are available under certain circumstances. For example,
45
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used by firms are taxed by fourteen states. Only four states currently apply the full sales
tax to manufacturing equipment purchases, with eight states either levying reduced rates
or limiting exemptions to new or expanding industries or to certain types of equipment.
Equipment used outside of manufacturing, such as office furniture, telephones, and
computers, are typically taxed among the sales-taxing states. Intrastate
telecommunications services are widely taxed while interstate telecommunications
services are widely exempt. Though there are common elements to many sales tax bases
as far as business purchases are concerned, treatment of some inputs such as utilities and
manufacturing equipment is not uniform.
Sales taxes levied on business input purchases, like any tax on a production factor,
can potentially be borne by investors, workers, or consumers. The distribution of the
burden among economic actors depends on the characteristics of the affected market. The
manufacturers of taxed business inputs are responsible for remitting the tax. If the taxing
jurisdiction is a small, open economy (which applies to most state and local governments
in the U.S.) and the firms located in the jurisdiction do not have market power, then the
prices of traded goods are set on the “world” market and are fixed from the jurisdiction’s
standpoint. 47 Under these conditions, input producers are unable to pass the tax forward to
their customers. The taxes can only be borne by one or more groups of factor owners
involved in the production of the taxed input. If capital is perfectly mobile and the taxing
jurisdiction is small and open, then the rental rate of capital is fixed outside the
jurisdiction. Consequently, investors escape the burden of the tax. It is instead borne by
the owners of the immobile factors of production: land and possibly labor. Hamilton and
Missouri exempts raw materials purchases made for research and development purposes by life science
companies doing agricultural, pharmaceutical, or food research.
47
See Tresch (2002, 566-570) for a discussion of tax incidence in an open economy.
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Whalley’s (1989) analysis of the welfare effects of Canada’s manufacturer’s sales tax
(MST) is the only general equilibrium analysis of a tax on business inputs of which I am
aware. The authors treat Canada as a small, open economy. Capital and labor are the
primary production inputs for each industry. Some firms produce intermediate goods
while others produce goods for final consumption. The intermediate goods are traded so
their prices are set in the global economy. The authors assume that capital is perfectly
mobile and that labor is immobile. Given the assumptions of the model, the results of the
analysis suggest that the burden of the MST was borne primarily by labor.
The assumption of perfect capital mobility may not apply equally to every industry
that is affected by a sales tax on inputs. Natural resources such as minerals, fossil fuels,
and timber are production inputs for many industries. Capital invested in natural resource
production may not be perfectly mobile. Consequently, investors in those industries may
bear a portion of the tax. Relaxing the assumption of perfect competition is also likely to
affect incidence. If the input producers have market power, then they can pass at least a
portion of the tax forward to the input-purchasing firms. Final incidence is difficult to
predict since it depends on the substitutability of the taxed input with inputs that are not
subject to the sales tax (e.g. land and labor), whether the final consumption goods are
traded, and the degree of competition in the markets for the final consumption goods.
There has been little formal analysis of these cases.
A tax on business input purchases, like any tax levied on firms, potentially reduces
economic efficiency by altering the allocation of capital across jurisdictions. The flow of
capital out of a jurisdiction reduces labor productivity which leads to a decline in wages.
Globalization is increasing competition between American localities and other countries,
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many of which use value-added taxes (VATs) instead of retail sales taxes. Since VATs tend
to exclude business inputs from taxation to a far greater extent than the typical sales tax
levied in the U.S., American subnational jurisdictions may find themselves at an economic
disadvantage (Mikesell 2001). Efficiency may also be hindered by tax-induced changes in
production decisions. Taxing input purchases creates a disincentive to replace old
equipment (Mikesell 2001) In-house production of inputs, or vertical integration, may also
be encouraged by business input taxation (Wildasin 2001; Mikesell 2001). 48
The taxation of business input purchases may reduce tax equity if firms are able to
pass these taxes forward to consumers. The incidence of these price increases across
income groups may be regressive, especially if the prices of goods that are often
statutorily exempt from the sales tax, such as groceries, include a portion of the sales taxes
on business input purchases. Applying an input-output model to data on Maryland,
Derrick and Scott (1993) find that the portion of the sales tax that is levied on business-tobusiness transactions is more regressive than the sales tax on final consumption goods.
The authors assumed that taxes paid on business-to-business transactions were passed
forward to consumers.
Even though the taxation of business inputs may hinder both efficiency and equity,
the inclusion of business inputs in the sales tax base may be politically-rational. The
portions of the burden that are deducted from the wages of resident workers, or the rental
income of landowners, or from the investment income of resident capital owners, are
hidden taxes. The low visibility of the business share of sales tax levies enables
governments to raise a given level of revenue at a lower advertised statutory rate. 49 If

48
49

The disincentives to purchase or replace equipment can be offset by special sales tax credits.
Lohmann and Weiss (2002) present a formal model in which the government raises revenue from
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capital invested in the taxed industry is immobile, then a portion of the burden is exported
to nonresidents. Firms can also deduct state and local sales taxes on business inputs from
their federal taxable income, since they are part of their normal business expenses, which
shifts a portion of the burden to taxpayers at the national level. Tax exporting
opportunities may enhance the political efficacy of taxing business inputs relative to
alternative bases. The analysis that follows examines the impact of tax exporting through
federal deductibility and interstate commerce on business sales tax levies.
Conceptual Framework
Political competition compels policymakers to take the economic interests and
equity preferences of their constituents into account when developing tax policy. The
theoretical model developed by Hettich and Winer (1999) is used to guide the analysis. In
this model, which was described in Chapter 2, governments choose the tax structure that
maximizes expected political support. A government can potentially obtain greater
support from voters by shifting tax burdens to non-residents. Thus, the politically-optimal
rate on each base should be increasing in the extent to which the burden is borne by
nonresidents. State and local sales taxes on firms could potentially be exported through
both the deductibility and interstate commerce channels. Firms can deduct state and local
taxes sales taxes on input purchases from their federal taxable income. Across all states,
this shifts a portion of subnational business sales tax levies to national taxpayers. Portions
of state and local sales taxes levied on firms that sell goods outside of the state and
perhaps have nonresident investors may be exported to nonresident consumers and/or
investors. This avenue for tax exporting may be particularly relevant for states with
commodity taxes and faces electoral competition. To voters, some commodity taxes are less visible than
others. The tax structure that maximizes the probability of reelection equates the perceived burdens of each
tax. The politically-optimal tax structure is characterized by a higher tax rate on the less salient tax.
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natural resources such as fossil fuels, precious metals, and timber. The ability of states to
export sales taxes on the purchase of natural resource inputs to nonresident consumers
depends on whether the state’s natural resource-oriented firms dominate their markets. If
those firms do not dominate their markets, then most of the exporting will be backwards to
out-of-state investors. The portion that is not borne by capital will most likely be divided
between in-state workers and land owners. Because of the potential exportability of taxes
on natural resource firms, states in which natural resource industries are prominent are
likely to obtain a larger share of sales tax revenue from business input purchases, ceteris
paribus.
The political efficacy of taxing firms may depend not just on the exportability of
business taxes but also on the exportability of taxes levied directly on households. The
deductibility of state and local personal income, property, and retail sales taxes under the
federal personal income tax has been an important avenue for the exportation of
subnational personal taxes. If the net-of-federal tax price of a deductible personal tax
rises, then state and local governments are likely to reduce reliance on that tax. If the
marginal loss of expected political support associated with increasing business sales taxes
is less than the marginal gain in expected support from additional revenue, then the
government will recoup at least some of the revenue lost from reducing the personal tax
by increasing business sales taxes. The political economy framework presented here can
be used to guide the empirical analysis that follows.
Empirical Implementation
This study utilizes state-level data on state and local sales taxes levied on business
input purchases. Estimates were provided by Cline et al (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,
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2009).50 The authors used national-level data from input-output tables by industry, statelevel data on value-added, sales, and employment by industry, and state and local data on
sales tax rates and special provisions to develop the estimates. Using national inputoutput relationships for each industry and state-level data on industry value-added, sales,
and employment, Cline et al (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) estimated state-level
input-output tables. They obtained estimates of sales taxes remitted from input purchases
by applying each state’s sales tax rates and special provisions to the estimated input
purchases.
The data cover sales tax levies from 2003 to 2008. I estimated models of the
effective sales tax rates on business input purchases and on consumer purchases,
separately. The effective rate on producers is measured with sales tax revenue from
business input purchases as a percentage of private-sector GDP. The effective rate on
consumers is measured with sales tax revenue from final consumption purchases as a
percentage of state personal income. To provide confidence that the results are not driven
by changes in the denominators, each model is also estimated with per-capita measures of
each type of sales tax levy. 51 The empirical model can be summarized by
(4.1)

(4.2)
where i and t are subscripts for the state and year, respectively. The subscript o denotes
neighboring states.

50

Ring (1989, 1999) provided estimates only for the state level. Consequently, his estimates could not be
appended to the data used in this study.
51
Because the first-order lag of the dependent variable is included on the right-hand side, the first year of
data from which the models are estimated is 2004.
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The term Tit refers to one of the four sales tax measures described above. Tit-1 is the firstorder temporal lag of the relevant tax measure. The first-order lag is included to control
for past state characteristics and events that may influence the contemporaneous tax rate.
The vector Eit consists of measures of a state’s capacity to export both business and
personal taxes. The benefit that a state derives from the exportation of business taxes
through deductibility is gauged with the percentage of state GDP constituted by gross
operating surplus. 52

53

Because a state’s tax structure may influence business location

decisions, the business share is treated as endogenous. The generalized method of
moments (GMM) model that I utilized is described below. Deductibility offsets for firms
may encourage subnational governments to utilize business taxes more heavily, ceteris
paribus.
The model includes the share of state private sector GDP constituted by valueadded from natural resource industries (mining, forestry, hunting, and fishing). Because
capital invested in these industries is likely to be characterized by a low degree of
mobility, large portions of taxes levied on production in these industries may be passed
backwards to capital owners, many of whom are likely to be nonresidents. The
prominence of natural resources in a state’s economy could be positively-related to sales
tax levies on business input purchases. The taxation of natural resource production may
enable state and local governments to reduce consumer sales tax levies. The ratio between
a state’s per-capita retail sales and the national average (Sales Activity Index) is used as a
proxy for the importance of tourism to a state’s economy. The tax-exporting opportunities

52

Gross operating surplus is the sum of proprietors' income and corporate capital charges, which consists of
corporate profits, rent payments made by corporations to landowners, and net interest payments.
53
An income-weighted net-of-federal deductibility tax price measure would be preferable but state-level data
on the mean marginal tax rates on C corporations, proprietors, and S corporations are unavailable.
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provided by tourism may encourage greater reliance on both consumer and producer sales
tax levies. The impacts ultimately depend on the manner in which each type of levy is
divided between tourists and residents.
The model also includes a measure of a state’s capacity to export personal taxes
via federal deductibility. During the time period analyzed, state and local personal
income, property, and sales taxes paid directly by consumers (in lieu of personal income
taxes) were deductible. Thus, the model includes the net-of-federal-deductibility price of
all deductible personal taxes. 54 The derivation of this measure was described in Chapter 2.
The tax price variable may potentially be positively-related to business sales tax levies.
States may respond to reductions in the exportability of personal taxes by increasing
business sales tax levies, provided that the marginal political costs associated with raising
those levies are not prohibitive. The effect on consumer levies could either be insignificant
or positive. Because taxpayers have not been able to deduct both subnational sales and
income taxes, the offset to consumer sales taxes may not have been meaningful in the
forty-one contiguous states with broad-based personal income taxes. Itemizers in those
states are likely to choose to deduct state and/or local income taxes over sales taxes since
they most likely pay a relatively higher fraction of their income to income taxes. A rise in
the net-of-federal tax price of deductible taxes raises the political cost of utilizing the
personal income tax. Consequently, subnational governments may respond by increasing
reliance on the consumer sales tax levies.
WTot denotes the weighted average values of the sales tax burden measure of

54

To calculate the net-of-federal tax price, I used data on state itemization rates from the Internal Revenue
Service’s Statistics of Income series. I used data on average marginal federal tax rates on wage income for
itemizers which were calculated from IRS samples of tax returns with the Taxsim program. Daniel Feenberg
computed the estimates and generously provided them.
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neighboring states, or its spatial lag. As I did in the analysis presented in the previous
chapter, I estimated the models with the simple contiguity and the population-weighted
contiguity spatial weights. I also treated the spatial lag and the tax price as endogenous.
The vector Xit consists of measures of state demographic and ideological
characteristics. Support for the use of regressive tax instruments such as the sales tax may
be weaker in states in which the poor and the non-poor tend to be of the same ethnicity.
The degree of tension between ethnic groups may be directly-related to support for
regressive taxation. Like the models that were presented in the previous chapter, these
models include the measure of the ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor
(Ethnic Congruence) as well as the residential segregation index. The African-American
share of the population is included to control for a possible inverse relationship between
the density of African-Americans among voters and the use of consumption taxes. The
model includes the measure of average voter liberalism developed by Berry et al (1998).
The component of the Berry et al (1998) measure of government liberalism that is not
explained by average voter liberalism (Government Liberalism Residual) is also included.
The models also control for the elderly population share and per-capita income. Θi and Yt
are state and year fixed effects, respectively.
Three variables in the model may be subject to reverse causation: the net-offederal-deductibility price of deductible personal taxes, the business share of state GDP
and the spatial lag of the relevant tax variable. Another estimation challenge is posed by
the possible correlation between the first-order temporal lag of the tax variable and the
state fixed effect. When a dependent variable is persistent or highly correlated across
time, then the first-order lag of the dependent variable may be correlated with the fixed
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effect. I employed a dynamic panel model to address the possible correlation of the firstorder lag of the tax variable and state fixed effect and also to address the possible
endogeneity of the four regressors stated above. The estimation framework is generalized
method of moments (GMM). The specific dynamic panel model that I utilized is the
system GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).55
The Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator could potentially generate consistent
estimates of the endogenous variables. Estimating the system of equations involves
estimating equation (4) in levels and differences simultaneously. This estimator utilizes
instrumental variables to obtain predicted values of the endogenous variables for inclusion
in the tax levy equations. For the differenced equation, the excluded instruments are the
second-order lags of the levels of the endogenous regressors. To increase the efficiency of
the estimates, the Blundell-Bond system includes equation (4) in levels. The excluded
instruments for the endogenous variables in levels are their lagged differences. In the
standard model, only the first-order lags of the differences are used since deeper lags are
likely to be redundant. The corresponding differenced and levels variables are stacked and
the first and second stage levels and differences equations are estimated as a system. The
estimates from the second stage levels and differences equations are constrained to be the
same so estimation of the system yields a single estimated equation. The Blundell-Bond
system GMM estimator provides consistent estimates of the coefficients of the
endogenous variables under the assumptions that there is no second-order serial
correlation and that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms. I test for the
validity of these assumptions and present the test results below.
55

Blundell and Bond (1998) builds upon previous developments presented by Arellano and Bond (1991) and
Arellano and Bover (1995). The correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the fixed effect
declines with time. Consequently, it is only a serious source of bias in short panels.
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The specification that I utilized is a departure from the standard Blundell-Bond
model. Because all available lags of the levels of the endogenous variables are used as
instruments, the model can potentially generate a large number of instruments. When the
number of cross-sectional units is small, which is the case with a state-level analysis, the
standard model can produce a large number of instruments relative to the sample size.
When the number of instruments is large relative to the sample size, the endogenous
variables may be over-fitted and the endogenous elements of those variables may not be
purged. An additional problem is that the test statistics may not be estimated precisely. To
reduce these risks, I limited the instrument set for the differenced equation to the first
available instruments for each year, which are the second-order lags of the endogenous
variables in levels.
It is possible that the error term consists of a spatial lag, φ MUj, and a mean-zero,
random error εit. In other words, spatial autocorrelation may be present in the model. It
can be caused by measurement error or by unobserved factors affecting a state’s tax rates
that are related across states (Anselin 1988). The scalar φ gives the magnitude of the
spatial autocorrelation while the matrix M is a weighting matrix that applies weights to the
residuals of all other states. If spatial autocorrelation exists, then the estimates will be
inefficient and the test statistics will be invalid. I modeled M as an inverse-distance
weighting matrix with a decay factor of two and a distance threshold beyond which
autocorrelation is assumed to be zero. The threshold of 1,036 miles was chosen because it
is the mean distance between state population centers. 56 The weighting matrix is given by

56

Setting the threshold at 1,639 miles, which is one standard deviation above the mean distance does not lead
to estimates that are substantially different. These results are not presented here but are available upon
request.
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(4.3)

Thus, states that are closer in terms of distance between Census state population centers
get more weight. With the decay term equal to 2, states that are further away get much
less weight than states that are relatively close. States that are more than 1,036 statute
miles away are assumed not to matter. Following Anselin and Kelejian (1997), I
conducted the Moran’s I test for the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the GMM
residuals from each equation. I used the weighting matrix given by (4.3) to weight the
residuals. 57 The tests rejected the null hypothesis of zero spatial autocorrelation only for
the equation effective sales tax rate on consumers with the simple contiguity spatial
weights. For that equation, the Cochrane-Orchut-style data transformation recommended
by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) was implemented to purge the spatial autocorrelation from
the data. The final specification utilized for all models was the Blundell-Bond GMM
model with clustering by state. Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics. The data
sources are presented in Appendix 1.
Results
The Blundell-Bond estimates for the producer levies models are presented in Table
4.2 while those for the consumer levies models are presented in Table 4.3. The
instruments are valid provided that second-order autocorrelation is not present and the
correlation between the instruments and the error term is not statistically significant. As
57

The weight matrix is row-normalized so that each row of weights sums to one and the matrix computes a
weighted average of the residuals of all other states.
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one can see in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, second-order autocorrelation does not appear to be
significant in any of the equations. Because the instruments outnumber the endogenous
variables, it is possible to test the exogeneity of the surfeit of instruments, or the
overidentification restrictions. The Hanson’s J test is a test of the exogeneity of the
overidentification restrictions that is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The
p-values for the Hanson’s J test indicate that the correlation between the surfeit of
instruments and the errors is never significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level.
These test results provide support for the estimates of the effects of the endogenous
regressors.
Looking at Table 4.2, we see that the net-of-federal-deductibility price of
deductible personal taxes has a significant and positive effect on both the effective sales
tax rate on business input purchases and on sales tax revenue from these purchases per
capita. This is the case whether the simple contiguity or population-weighted contiguity
matrix is used to calculate the spatial lag. The tax price of deductible personal taxes does
not appear to have a significant impact on sales tax levies on consumer purchases. These
results suggest that if the exportability of personal taxes via deductibility is reduced,
which would be reflected in a higher net-of-deductibility price, then state and local
governments are likely to respond by increasing sales tax levies on firms. The
deductibility offset available to firms does not appear to have significant impacts on
producer sales tax levies. Neither the natural resources share of private GDP nor the Sales
Activity Index appear to have significant impacts on producer or consumer sales tax levies.
Thus, the potential tax exporting opportunities offered by natural resources-oriented
production and tourism do not appear to be significant determinants of sales tax levies on
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producers or consumers.
Other results are worth discussing briefly. Ethnic Congruence is inversely-related
to both the effective sales tax rate on producers and producer sales tax levies per-capita.
The effects are small in magnitude. It does not appear to be significantly related to
consumer sales tax levies. It is possible that altruism among the non-poor is weaker when
the poor and non-poor tend to be members of different ethnic group(s). If this is the case,
then the non-poor may get more disutility from taxation in relatively heterogeneous states.
It may be politically-efficacious for governments in relatively heterogeneous states to rely
more heavily on hidden taxes like the sales tax on business purchases. The first-order lags
of the dependent variables have positive and highly significant coefficients in all
specifications. The spatial lag is significant only in the equation for the effective sales tax
rate on consumers and only when the simple contiguity spatial weights are used. Thus,
these analyses do not present robust evidence of spatial interaction in the determination of
sales tax levies on consumers and producers.
Policy Implications
As was discussed in Chapter2, an increase in the net-of-deductibility price for
personal taxes is likely to prompt state and local governments to reduce the burdens
imposed by personal income and property taxes. Changes in personal income and
property tax burdens could be accompanied by a number of policy changes in other areas
of state and local budgets. Governments could reduce spending or increase the burdens
imposed by other taxes. The analysis presented here suggests that they are likely to offset
reductions in personal income and property taxes by increasing business sales tax levies.
The estimated effects are large enough to suggest that substantial reductions in the value
of the deductibility offset for personal taxes could lead to significant increases in business
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sales tax levies.
The elimination of the deductibility of state and local personal taxes is periodically
considered by federal policymakers. This is because it is a relatively large tax expenditure
that cost the federal government approximately $78 billion dollars in 2008. 58 Elimination
of the deductibility of personal taxes was recommended by the U.S. Treasury and by
President Reagan in the mid-1980s and by a presidential advisory panel in 2005 (see U.S.
Treasury 1984; President Reagan 1985; and President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform 2005). These reports recommended the elimination of deductibility under the
belief that most state and local expenditures do not have strong national spillovers and
those that do should be subsidized with direct federal outlays. If deductibility had been
eliminated in 2008, the most recent year in this dataset, the net-of-deductibility price of
deductible personal state and local taxes would rise from $0.935 to $1.00. The estimates
presented here suggest that, on average, this policy change would have lead to substantial
increases in the effective sales tax rate on producers and in sales tax revenue from
business input purchases per-capita. These predicted effects are summarized in Table 4.4.
The estimated effect of the elimination of deductibility on producer sales tax levies
depends on the way that producer levies are scaled and on the specification of the spatial
lag. Regardless of the specification of the spatial lag, the average estimated effect of
elimination of deductibility in 2008 is an increase in the effective sales tax rate on
producers of approximately thirty percent of the mean of that tax variable. When the
simple contiguity spatial weights are used, the average estimated effect of the elimination
of deductibility is an increase in producer sales tax levies per-capita equal to about twenty-

58

See Urban Institute and Brookings Institution (2009).
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/expenditures/largest.cfm.
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five percent of the mean. The estimated effect is somewhat smaller when the populationweighted contiguity spatial weights are used.
Tax incidence analysis suggests that while portions of these increases may be
exported to nonresident capital owners (in jurisdictions in which capital is immobile),
substantial shares may be divided among resident workers and landowners. Residents
may not be aware of this shift of tax burdens from personal income and property taxes
toward business taxes that end up deducted from wages or rental income. Thus, the
elimination of deductibility could prompt state and local governments to make tax policy
changes that reduce the transparency of the tax system. From a normative standpoint, this
is problematic since increased reliance on hidden taxes hinders the ability of citizens to
compare the costs and benefits of subnational public services. The predicted increases in
sales taxes on firms may also promote the flight of capital to jurisdictions, perhaps abroad,
with lower business tax levies. Thus, any efficiency gains that may arise from reductions
in personal income and property tax burdens may be offset by distortions generated by
increases in sales tax levies on firms.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to provide insights on the incentives that
policymakers have to apply the sales tax to input purchases made by firms. Previous
studies have presented evidence that suggests that tax exporting influences state and local
tax structure but they have devoted little attention to the effects of tax exporting on taxes
that are levied on firms. This study used state-level panel data on state and local sales
taxes garnered from business input purchases and a GMM model to estimate the effects of
potential tax exporting capacities on sales taxes levied on firms. I find that these levies,
whether measured as a percentage of private-sector GDP or per-capita, are largely
75

determined by the exportability of state and local personal taxes via deductibility. When
the exportability of personal taxes via deductibility is high (low), sales taxes on firms are
likely to be low (high), ceteris paribus. The study did not yield evidence that the state and
local sales taxes levied on firms are influenced by the exportability of business taxes.
Interstate tax competition does not appear to constrain the taxation of business input
purchases by subnational governments.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Effective Rate on Producers

0.99

0.53

0

2.75

Producer Levies Per-Capita

352.76

201.02

0

1083.71

Effective Rate on Consumers

1.4

0.62

0

3.02

Consumer Levies Per-Capita

474.2

196.38

0

1232.42

Tax Price

0.93

0.02

0.88

0.97

Business Share

35.3

4.112

28.446

52.166

Natural Resources

3.21

6.14

0.05

39.98

Sales Activity Index

1.039

0.168

0.544

1.671

Per-Capita Income ($1,000)

34.75

5.16

25.35

52.73

Age 65+

12.79

1.51

8.63

17.4

Ethnic Congruence

0.569

0.162

0.312

0.936

Residential Segregation Index

53.768

8.949

33.804

71.504

African American

10.023

9.513

0.14

37.36

Average Voter Liberalism

55.507

15.977

20.254

93.282

Government Liberalism Residual

54.76

27.842

5.359

33.383
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Table 4.2: Blundell-Bond Estimates for Sales Tax Levies on Producers
(1)

(2)

Effective Rate on Producers

(3)

(4)

Producer Levies Per-Capita

Contiguity

Population

Contiguity

Population

First-Order Lag of Producer Levies

0.734***
(0.000)

0.736***
(0.000)

0.779***
(0.000)

0.776***
(0.000)

Tax Price

4.951**
(0.035)

4.929**
(0.035)

1459.4**
(0.033)

1282.8**
(0.019)

Business Share

0.005
(0.469)

0.005
(0.457)

4.143
(0.184)

2.992
(0.351)

Natural Resources

0.003
(0.614)

0.003
(0.650)

1.800
(0.324)

2.540*
(0.096)

Sales Activity Index

-0.010
(0.893)

-0.012
(0.878)

-9.604
(0.759)

4.884
(0.843)

Neighbors’ Producer Levies

-0.035
(0.617)

-0.078
(0.622)

-0.118
(0.162)

-0.132
(0.184)

-0.411**
(0.043)

-0.377*
(0.053)

-118.6**
(0.022)

-124.8**
(0.024)

Residential Segregation

0.002
(0.536)

0.002
(0.545)

0.773
(0.336)

0.774
(0.432)

African American

-0.003

-0.003

-0.955

-0.921

(0.289)

(0.289)

(0.143)

(0.207)

Age 65 +

-0.012
(0.414)

-0.012
(0.421)

-4.586
(0.287)

-5.763
(0.218)

Per-Capita Income ($1,000)

0.0001
(0.977)

0.0002
(0.973)

2.231
(0.126)

2.186*
(0.085)

Average Voter Liberalism

-0.001

-0.001

-0.485

-0.173

(0.359)

(0.353)

(0.175)

(0.682)

Government Liberalism Residual

0.0002

0.0002

-0.007

-0.028

(0.780)

(0.775)

(0.981)

(0.915)

Constant

-4.126*
(0.051)

-4.114*
(0.051)

-1344.7**
(0.031)

-1149.3**
(0.018)

Second-Order Autocorrelation Test
(p-value)

0.424

0.413

0.568

0.606

Hanson's J (p-value)

0.167

0.263

0.267

0.366

240

240

240

240

Ethnic Congruence

N
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10
** p<0.05
*** p<0.01
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Table 4.3: Blundell-Bond Estimates for Sales Tax Levies on Consumers
(1)

(2)

Effective Rate on Consumers

(3)

(4)

Consumer Levies Per-Capita

Contiguity

Population

Contiguity

Population

0.824***
(0.000)

0.853***
(0.000)

0.907***
(0.000)

0.897***
(0.000)

Tax Price

0.958
(0.752)

2.226
(0.348)

577.8
(0.547)

980.1
(0.194)

Business Share

-0.001
(0.903)

0.004
(0.546)

1.265
(0.438)

1.937
(0.311)

Natural Resources

0.003
(0.672)

0.001
(0.849)

1.411
(0.456)

0.864
(0.588)

Sales Activity Index

-0.049
(0.870)

-0.012
(0.862)

-11.68
(0.708)

-10.44
(0.718)

Neighbors’ Consumer Levies

0.287**
(0.038)

0.011
(0.932)

-0.006
(0.959)

-0.065
(0.511)

Ethnic Congruence

-0.170
(0.598)

-0.183
(0.539)

-22.42
(0.744)

-41.62
(0.619)

Residential Segregation

-0.001
(0.788)

0.0003
(0.911)

-0.179
(0.839)

-0.218
(0.772)

African American

-0.005

-0.0005

0.020

0.125

(0.329)

(0.935)

(0.974)

(0.877)

Age 65 +

0.026
(0.101)

-0.0006
(0.966)

0.853
(0.850)

-1.542
(0.754)

Per-Capita Income ($1,000)

0.002
(0.738)

-0.002
(0.742)

2.025
(0.286)

2.006*
(0.078)

0.001

-0.0004

-0.109

-0.055

(0.653)

(0.770)

(0.855)

(0.916)

0.0001

-0.0001

-0.122

-0.142

(0.920)

(0.852)

(0.418)

(0.371)

-1.633
(0.654)

-1.772
(0.458)

-559.6
(0.540)

-884.6
(0.176)

Second-Order Autocorrelation Test
(p-value)

0.286

0.260

0.250

0.242

Hanson's J (p-value)

0.403

0.517

0.417

0.677

240

240

240

240

First-Order Lag of Consumer Levies

Average Voter Liberalism
Government Liberalism Residual
Constant

N
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10
** p<0.05
*** p<0.01
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Table 4.4: Effects of the Elimination of Federal Deductibility of Personal Taxes on
Sales Tax Levies on Producers

Effective Sales Tax Rate on Producers
with simple contiguity matrix
with population-weighted contiguity matrix
Producer Levies Per-Capita
with simple contiguity matrix
with population-weighted contiguity matrix

Effect

% Change from the Mean of Tax
Measure in 2008

0.302
0.301

30.69
30.59

$89.02
$78.25

24.79
21.73

Copyright © John M. Foster 2012
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Chapter 5:

Summary, Conclusions, and Research Prospects

Dissertation Summary
State and local governments utilize multiple tax instruments. The choice of tax
rates, or the tax structure, influences the efficiency and equity of subnational fiscal
systems. The determination of tax structure at the subnational level requires policymakers
to make tradeoffs between efficiency, equity, and the potential political benefits from tax
exporting. Thus, variation in state and local structures may reflect variation in voter
ideology, demographics, tax exporting capacities, and regional fiscal landscapes. This
dissertation presents two empirical studies that extend the positive empirical literature on
state and local tax structure determination.
Chapter 2 reviewed three empirical literatures that are relevant for the research
presented in the two empirical chapters: the political science literature on the influence of
ideology on state and local tax progressivity and the empirical economics literatures on tax
exporting and tax competition. These studies also account for most of the positive
empirical analysis of state and local tax policy that has been conducted. Researchers have
found a direct relationship between average voter liberalism and state and local tax
progressivity. However, the studies used measures of voter ideology that either did not
account for change in the electorate’s ideological orientation over time, or they failed to
account for differences in the intensity of an electorate’s liberalism, or they suffered from
other limitations. Economists have found that tax exporting capacities and tax
competition have significant impacts on state and local tax structures. The tax competition
literature presents evidence of mimicking among subnational governments for state excise
and corporate income tax rates and for local property tax rates. The majority of studies
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that have examined state income and sales tax competition have found negative
relationships, suggesting the development of tax havens within regions. Researchers have
consistently found that tax exporting through the deductibility of state and local taxes from
the federal income tax is important in explaining subnational income and property tax
levies. The corporate income tax is the only business that has been considered in the tax
exporting literature. Consequently, little is known about the effects of tax exporting on
levies that fall exclusively on businesses. None of the studies discussed in Chapter 2
included proxies for the benefit that a jurisdiction derives from the deductibility of state
and local business taxes under the federal corporate and personal income taxes.
Chapter 3 explored the influence of average voter liberalism on state and local tax
progressivity. I used a measure of ideology that was developed by Berry, Ringquist,
Fording, and Hansen (1998). This measure has not been used in previous studies of state
and local tax progressivity. The measure developed by Berry et al (1998) is potentially an
improvement over the measures used in previous studies for the following reasons: it
varies over time and potentially captures differences in the intensity of liberalism among
states, among other potential benefits. I found that average voter liberalism is
significantly and positively related to state and local tax progressivity. However, the
magnitude of the effect is small. The ethnic demographic context appears to exert
powerful influences on the progressivity of the tax structures that state and local
governments utilize. The ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor is
directly-related to progressivity. The congeniality of ethnic group relations, measured
with a residential segregation index, appears to have a negative impact. These results
suggest that voter preferences concerning revenue-side redistribution are substantially
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influenced by ethnic group loyalty and by the degree of tension between ethnic groups.
The fact that ethnic demographic characteristics have significant effects even with average
voter liberalism held constant suggests that these variables may reflect components of
voter preferences that are not captured by measures of general voter ideology. This study
is the first to examine the relationship between ethnic residential segregation and state and
local tax progressivity.
Chapter 4 examined the relationship between tax exporting and state and local
sales tax levies on business input purchases. The taxation of business inputs may hinder
efficiency by discouraging production in a particular state or by encouraging vertical
integration among firms. If firms are able to pass taxes on inputs forward to consumers,
then statutory exemptions of final consumption goods from the sales base, such as the
exemption for groceries, may be offset. Despite these problems, the political costs of
taxing business input purchases may be relatively low because of low burden salience and
also due to tax exporting opportunities. The study did not yield evidence that the state and
local sales taxes levied on firms are influenced by the exportability of business taxes. I
found evidence of an inverse relationship between the deductibility offset for personal
taxes and producer sales tax levies, whether those levies were measured per-capita or as a
percentage of state private sector GDP. In states in which the offset is relatively small,
governments may rely more heavily on producer sales taxes because of their relatively low
salience. Federal deductibility does not appear to significantly impact sales tax levies on
consumer purchases. The ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor is
significantly and positively related to producer sales tax levies. The effects are small in
magnitude. Voters may get more disutility from taxation in states that are ethnically
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heterogeneous. Consequently, governments in these states may rely more heavily on
producer sales taxes because of their relatively low salience. Tax competition does not
appear to significantly affect sales tax levies on producers or consumers.
Policy Implications
Empirical models of state and local tax policies can provide predictions for how
those policies may change in response to changes in relevant demographic, political, and
economic parameters. Population projections developed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census
suggest that significant changes in the nation’s ethnic composition will occur in the
proceeding decades. From 2010 to 2050, the Hispanic share of the population is projected
to rise from fifteen percent to twenty-four percent. The effects that these changes will
have on the ethnic similarity between the poor and the non-poor will depend on the
upward mobility of Hispanics in the proceeding decades. If the growth of the Hispanic
population increases the Hispanic share of the poor population without leading to
increases in the Hispanic share of the non-poor population that are at least equal in
magnitude, then it may place downward pressure on popular support for progressive
taxation. The effects may be less pronounced if tensions between ethnic groups subside.
The elimination of the deductibility of state and local personal taxes is periodically
considered by federal policymakers as a means to recover revenue, enhance the equity of
the federal income tax, and reduce the inefficiency that it engenders. The indirect subsidy
to state and local public spending that deductibility provides is viewed as being
superfluous, inequitable, and inefficient by many experts. A large fraction of state and
local public expenditure is subsidized by the federal government through direct grant
programs. Deductibility confers disproportionate benefits to relatively wealthy states in
which relatively high proportions of taxpayers itemize and face relatively high federal tax
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rates. It also potentially subsidizes state and local services that are not characterized by
national spillovers. The effects of the elimination of deductibility on the efficiency and
equity of the combined federal, state, and local tax system would depend, in part, on the
policy responses from state and local governments.
The analyses presented here suggest that the elimination of deductibility would
lead to a significant increase in the sales tax levies on business input purchases. These
policy changes could lead to distortions in the allocation of capital. As was mentioned
above, the empirical literature suggests that the elimination of deductibility could lead to
significant reductions in income and property tax rates which may reduce the deadweight
losses imposed by the tax system. The economic effects of these policy changes should be
weighed against those of the potential increases in producer sales tax levies.
Limitations and Future Research
There are key limitations to this dissertation that suggest interesting avenues for
future research. First, the tax incidence data utilized in Chapter 3 did not include data on
user fees. The research presented here could be extended by examining the effects of
voter ideology, ethnic demographics, and tax exporting capacities on the use of fees to
finance subnational public services such as higher education.
A second important limitation to this dissertation is its focus on state and local tax
policies. The analyses presented here do not provide insights on the effects of voter
ideology, ethnic demographics, and tax exporting on federal tax policy. Estimates of the
effects of shifts in these parameters on national tax systems could be obtained through
analysis of cross-country data. A cross-country study of the determinants of tax
progressivity would require tax incidence data that are comparable across countries.
This dissertation provides limited information on the objectives that governments
85

pursue when they implement tax policies. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the utility
maximization, Leviathan, and probabilistic voting models all predict that governments are
likely to take advantage of tax exporting opportunities and are likely to be responsive to
citizen ideology and altruism to some degree. The analyses presented here suggest that
governments are responsive to voter preferences. However, the results do not tell us
whether governments choose the tax structures that maximize revenue, which is consistent
with the Leviathan model, or if they intend to maximize expected political support, as the
probabilistic voting model predicts, or if their primary goal is to maximize the
representative citizen's utility. Future research could perhaps derive testable implications
from one of the models that is consistent with that model but not with the others. Such
research would improve our understanding of the efficiency of the public sector.

Copyright © John M. Foster 2012
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Appendix 1
Table A.1: Data Sources
Variable

Average Tax Rate Estimates

Source
Citizens for Tax Justice/Institute on Taxation and
Economic Policy (2003); Institute on Taxation and
Economic Policy (2009).

Effective Sales Tax Rate on Producers

Cline et al (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009)

Producer Sales Tax Levies Per-Capita

Same as above.

Effective Sales Tax Rate on Consumers

Same as above.

Consumer Sales Tax Levies Per-Capita
Average Voter Liberalism, Government
Liberalism

Same as above.
Richard Fording’s website:
http://www.bama.ua.edu/~rcfording/stateideology.html

Residential Segregation

William H. Frey and the University of Michigan Social
Science Data Analysis Network.

Tax Price
Sales Activity Index
Mining, Natural Resources, Per-Capita
Income, Business Share

Union Density

Calculated by author using data from U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; United States
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Annual Social and Economic Supplement Survey,
various years.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/
59
Hirsch et al (2001)

Poverty Rate

University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research

Income Inequality, Number of Children
Per Household, Ethnic Congruence,
Marriage Rate
Age 65+, African American

59

U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income,
various years; Daniel Feenberg
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years.
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, various years.

The estimates are updated annually at http://www.unionstats.com/.
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Appendix 2
Methodology Used to Develop the Tax Burden Measures for Chapter 3
The tax burden estimates used here were provided by the Institute on Taxation and
Economic Policy (2003, 2009). The authors used samples of IRS tax returns, data from
the U.S. Census Bureau, and other sources to estimate the personal income, general sales,
cigarette, gasoline, beer, corporate income, and property tax burdens for samples of
households that are representative at the state level. The authors assumed that households
bear the income tax burden that is levied on them and use state and local tax provisions to
estimate the income tax burdens for each household. Estimates of the homeowner
property tax burden borne by itemizing homeowners were derived from IRS tax return
data. The burdens for non-itemizers were imputed using data from the Census and other
sources. Property tax relief provisions, such as “circuit breakers” were treated as
reductions in property taxes even if actually delivered as reductions in income taxes.
Sales tax relief provisions were handled in the same manner.
The authors estimated the sales tax burdens for their samples by imputing
expenditures for numerous items and calculating the tax burdens based on those
expenditures. More specifically, the authors started with data from Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CES) and estimated a model of expenditure on each item from the CES data using
demographic variables that are common to both the IRS and CES datasets. The authors
then used the estimated model to impute the consumption expenditures for the households
in the sample of IRS tax returns. The sales and excise tax burdens are estimated by
applying state and local sales and excise tax provisions.
Business property and corporate income tax burdens were estimated by first
allocating the national total business property and corporate income burden to the states in
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relation to each state’s share of national capital income. The authors proceeded to allocate
a particular state’s business property and corporate income tax burden across that state’s
income groups according to each group’s share of state capital income. In states that
imposed business property and corporate income taxes that were significantly above the
national median, the authors assigned the excess to either in-state wages or in-and-out-ofstate consumption depending on the activity.
The authors also accounted for sales and excise taxes paid by visitors and for the
sales and excise taxes levied on firms. Sales and excise taxes levied on firms were divided
into those paid by industries producing for domestic markets and those producing for
national markets. Taxes on domestic market items were assigned to residents of each state
in proportion to their share of the state’s consumption expenditures on each item (amounts
paid by visitors were subtracted from the totals). Taxes on national market items were
assigned to national consumption with an adjustment to reflect a portion assumed to be
retained in-state. These adjustment factors were adjusted downward in states where
personal income as a share of state GDP was below the national median. In states that
imposed relatively high sales and excise taxes on national market activities, firms may not
be able to pass the entire burden forward to consumers because of competitive factors.
Because capital and labor are immobile in the short-run, portions of these taxes may be
shifted back to wages and capital. The authors computed total national market business
sales and excise taxes as a share of each state’s national market GDP. If the national
market business tax burden was significantly above the national median, then the authors
divided the excess evenly between in-state wages and capital. A state’s share of this
particular capital tax burden depends on its share of national capital. The capital portion
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was divided among capital owners based on each capital owner’s share of state capital
income.
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